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What is thinking? When I plan a grocery list in my head, am I thinking? What about deduction—
that ought to count for thinking at least. However, does thinking need to involve production of 
new thoughts? If the deduction is valid, all that I come up with should already be contained in the 
premises. Do we ever actually think something new, something we haven’t already picked up 
from somewhere, a book or a past experience?  
In my Master’s thesis, I am going to introduce a novel interpretation of Gilles Deleuze’s (1925–
1995)1 concept “transcendent thinking”. The most significant result of my work here is that it 
reveals the conditions of creativity in thinking. I build my interpretation unto the novel 
philosophy of difference Deleuze introduces in Difference and Repetition (1968), and the 
ontological scheme he unveils there. Deleuze’s reading of Immanuel Kant provides a model of 
empirical thinking, which is incapable of creation, as well as functioning as the backdrop for my 
reading of transcendent thinking. 
Methodologically, I will offer close readings of relevant passages and contextualize them in 
Deleuze’s overall project in Difference and Repetition. Many of the Deleuze’s works of the 60s 
touch upon the themes of Difference and Repetition, but I will focus almost exclusively on 
Difference and Repetition. The book is animated by a very distinct project. It is my conviction 
that the overall project of Difference and Repetition cannot be found in its complexity and 
coherence in other works2, rendering difficult the use of these sources. However, sometimes, we 
find helpful clarifications and more thorough expositions of interpretations of other thinkers in 
other works. Deleuze’s readings of Immanuel Kant have been especially important for my work. 
As Deleuze’s readings of the history of philosophy arise from his own questions and include 
highly original (and at times textually unfounded) interpretations, my aim is to understand 
 
1 Deleuze belongs to the generation of French philosophers who began their philosophical careers in the heyday of 
structuralism, but who began to question many of the assumptions of this heterogenous movement. For this reason, 
Deleuze, along with, for instance, such divergent figures as Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) and Jean-François Lyotard 
(1924–1998), are often classified as post-structuralists. (see Schrift 2006.)   
2 One exception is the short text Method of Dramatisation (1967), which is a transcription of Deleuze’s presentation 
to the French Philosophy Society. This text clearly presents material which can be taken to correlate with the 4th and 
5th chapters of Difference and Repetition. David Lapoujade shares this conviction (see editor’s footnote, Deleuze 
2002b, 131). Logic of Sense (1969) was released almost simultaneously with Difference and Repetition (1968), but 




Deleuze, not evaluate how these readings portray the philosopher in question3. The early 
monograph Kant’s Critical Philosophy (1963) has been important, and I have also used the much 
later fourth chapter of Essays Critical and Clinical (1993), On Four Poetic Formulas that Might 
Summarize Kantian Philosophy 4, as well as Deleuze’s lecture course, Kant: Synthesis and Time, 
from 1978. These texts coincide, contextualize or complement Deleuze’s reading of Kant in 
Difference and Repetition5. 
I also discuss other interpretations of Deleuze’s work. However, Deleuze is the object of ever-
increasing academic research within philosophy and other fields, and due to the scope of this 
Master thesis, choosing which secondary sources to examine closer has been necessary. The topic 
of the thesis has guided me in this, and I believe I have consulted a fairly comprehensive number 
of studies which treat in detail thinking in Difference and Repetition. Daniela Voss’s Conditions 
of Thought. Deleuze and Transcendental Ideas (2013) has been especially helpful6. 
Deleuze’s conception of thinking in Difference and Repetition is a topic which poses difficulties 
considering the scope of my Master’s thesis. To arrive at thinking, we need to first understand 
Deleuze’s complex ontological scheme, which I introduce in chapter two. Because this scheme is 
very complex and uses idiosyncratic novel terminology, I cannot justify in detail my 
interpretations of all the details of it. In the second chapter, I paraphrase Deleuze a lot and rely on 
interpretations from secondary literature. However, I have striven to discern to the reader (mostly 
in the footnotes to the text) where definitive interpretational problems arise with Deleuze’s 
ontology. In the last three chapters, where I discuss Deleuze’s conception of thinking (both 
empirical and transcendent) and creation, I provide detailed readings of key passages and other 
textual evidence and justify each step in my interpretation. 
 
3 Deleuze’s readings thinkers from the history of philosophy arise from Deleuze’s own questions and his 
interpretations resemble only faintly the original authors—e.g. Nietzsche as a systematic philosopher of forces in 
Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962). Deleuze himself stated that “I imagined myself as taking the author from the back 
and making for them a child that would be theirs and, at the same time, be monstrous” (Deleuze 1990, 15). 
4 Anne Sauvagnargues mentions that this text was first released as a preface to the English translation of Kant’s 
Critical Philosophy in 1984 (Sauvagnargues 2010, footnote 2, p. 23), placing it in the relative proximity of the 1978 
lectures on Kant. 
5 In my Master’s thesis, the coherence of Deleuze’s Kant interpretations cannot be explored in depth. 
6 Levi Bryant’s Difference and Givenness (2008) is in many respects a good interpretation of Difference and 
Repetition. It is also one of the few monographs that offers a detailed discussion of Deleuze’s conception of thinking. 




At times, Deleuze only sketches an idea in broad terms, or fails to tackle an important issue at all. 
There are key questions concerning thinking in Difference and Repetition which we must solve 
ourselves on the basis of the book. In interpreting these issues, I have utilized the principle of 
charitable interpretation. I have aimed to offer a reading which is most defensible, and which   
fits together with other aspects of Deleuze’s project in Difference and Repetition7. 
My thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter one introduces the main themes of Difference and 
Repetition, namely, internal difference and the hidden repetition linked to it. This chapter 
corresponds to the first two chapters of Difference and Repetition, where Deleuze motivates his 
goals in reference to the history of philosophy. However, I am going to limit my scope to what is 
important to my topic: thinking. I begin with how Deleuze traces his conception of internal 
difference to Kant’s criticism of Descartes’s cogito. In short, Kant sees that the act of thought 
cannot attain itself per se, but only as given in time. Deleuze continues that time is the form of 
change, and as such works as the internal difference of the cogito. Next, I outline Deleuze’s 
reading of Deleuze’s time as the form of change, and then end the chapter by showing how 
Deleuze describes the emergence of passive subjectivity through syntheses of time. 
In chapter two, I go over Deleuze’s ontological scheme, which he introduces in chapters four and 
five of Difference and Repetition. Here, we see how Deleuze introduces three ontological orders: 
the actual, intensity and the virtual. I navigate through these by showing how Deleuze explains 
the emergence and persistence of actual objects by them. For Deleuze, intensity, as the order of 
intensive differences, gives rise to quality and extension, and brings about change—it constitutes 
actual objects. As actual objects change, virtual Ideas orient this process. 
In a sense, my two first chapters constitute a repetition of the same theme8. The first chapter 
discusses Deleuze’s motivation and background for his project exclusively in terms of internal 
difference and hidden repetition. The second chapter introduces Deleuze’s ontological scheme, 
which fulfils the requirements of this novel conception of internal difference. Internal difference 
 
7 For example, Deleuze indirectly states that the process of differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation coincides with transcendent thinking at 
the end of the third chapter of Difference and Repetition (I return to this later). However, he neglects outlining how 
the faculties and the psychic system fit into this process. I provide an interpretation of this in 4.2. 
8 The same can be said about chapters 4 and 5 of Difference and Repetition being a repetition of chapter 1 and 2, but 




finds its guise in Deleuze’s notion of intensity, but it is also exemplified by the differential 
relations of virtual Ideas, which contain non-representationally all the possible variations of a 




iation—the hidden repetition which engenders persisting actual objects. To properly 
understand the ontological scheme of Difference and Repetition, an understanding of internal 
difference and hidden repetition is required. What’s more, understanding Deleuze’s conception of 
thinking, again, presupposes understanding all of this, as we shall see later. 
The third chapter exposes what Deleuze calls “empirical thinking”. I introduce it through 
Deleuze’s reading of Kant’s determining judgment, and it provides the backdrop for dealing with 
Deleuze’s conception of transcendent thinking. I also discuss Deleuze’s criticism of the dogmatic 
image of thought (a conceptualization of what thinking is) from the perspective of thinking. I 
close the chapter by discussing Deleuze’s reading of Kant’s judgment of the sublime as pointing 
towards the possibility of transcendent thinking. In this way, Deleuze’s conception of 
transcendent thinking builds unto his reading of Kant because he utilizes a modified version of 
the theory of faculties, and as I argue below, he takes determining judgment to be a kind of 
thinking—empirical thinking. 
In the fourth chapter, I am finally equipped to present my interpretation of transcendent thinking. 
Transcendent thinking is constituted by a chain of encounters beginning from sensibility. A 
virtual Idea traverses the faculties, elevating them to their transcendent exercise. The limit object 
is something which only the faculty in question can encounter, and it opens the faculty to its 
internal difference. Together, these transcendent exercises of the faculties make up transcendent 
thinking. In it, the faculties work according to a para-sense, opposed to their harmonious 
collaboration in their empirical use. The resulting transcendent thinking is involuntary, sub-
representational and unconscious (because conscious exercise is empirical and representational), 
escaping the yoke of representation in the dogmatic image of thought Deleuze criticizes.  
In the final chapter, I introduce the conclusions of my study: the ways my interpretation of 
transcendent thinking ameliorates our understanding of thinking in Difference and Repetition, 
and how this concept reveals the conditions of creation and creativity in thinking. I also note that 




evaluate critically Deleuze’s idea of thinking: does Deleuze succeed where his predecessors, and 
especially Kant, failed according to him? I finish with a discussion of the lines of research my 
Master’s thesis opens. 
1. Deleuze’s Novel Philosophy of Difference 
In the preface of Difference and Repetition, Deleuze outlines the overall goal for his doctoral 
thesis: to introduce a novel philosophy of difference. First, Deleuze delineates the notion of a 
“pure difference” or, as I will call it, internal difference9. Deleuze accuses the history of 
philosophy of subjugating difference to other concepts. For example, when we perceive two 
bottles on the table, we rely on the concept of identity if we distinguish them by referring to their 
identities: bottle A is different from bottle B, because they do not share the same identity. For 
Deleuze, both bottles have their internal differences, which is more fundamental than the identity 
we ascribe to them.  
Second, internal difference aligns itself with the notion of “complex repetition” (DR, 2). 
According to Deleuze, below physical and mechanical repetitions (such as the ticking of a clock), 
there is a deeper, “hidden repetition”, which makes the other kind of repetition possible. 
However, these two notions, that of an internal difference and a hidden repetition, “seem to unite 
and mix themselves on all occasions” (DR, 2). Therefore, the overall goal of Difference and 
Repetition is to develop an account of these two notions—something prior philosophy has failed 
to do adequately.  
In this chapter, I am first going to discuss how Deleuze traces his conception of internal 
difference to Kant’s critique of Descartes. For Kant, Descartes was mistaken in taking an act of 
thought to determine a thinker’s existence. The thinker can only attain itself as given in time. 
However, when the thinker attains itself only as given in time, it attains itself as something 
different from what it was. This constitutes a moment where the thinker’s internal difference is 
revealed. Second, I am going to discuss how internal difference and hidden repetition are linked 
to each other. This requires looking at Deleuze’s conception of time, as the unchanging form of 
change. Deleuze’s reading of eternal return, as the eternal return of the dissimilar, brings together 
 





internal difference and hidden repetition. Third, I will discuss how Deleuze describes the 
production of passive subjectivity through three syntheses of time. 
1.1. Deleuze’s Kantian Moment 
According to Deleuze, Kant was the first to discover internal difference. This discovery was 
made in Kant’s criticism of Descartes’s cogito. The act of thought cannot itself determine an 
existence but, as Kant insists, it must first be determinable, given in time. According to Deleuze, 
this constitutes the discovery of “internal Difference, which relates a priori being and thinking to 
one another” (DR, 116)10.  Next, I will navigate through Deleuze’s reading of Descartes and 
Kant. 
In the first Meditation, Descartes sets out to discover a foundation for building the sciences 
(Descartes 2018 (or. 1641), VII, 17). To discover what could function as a true foundation for all 
knowledge, Descartes employs the method of doubt to discard all his opinions, which are not 
necessary. For instance, the senses can be tricked: an object seen from afar can be mistaken to be 
something other than it is revealed to be in close inspection. Even a dream can be mistaken for 
real experience. Descartes ends up rejecting sense perception about objects, and beliefs about his 
own body as a potential foundation. What lies beyond doubt?  
In the second Meditation, Descartes arrives at the act of doubting, which itself cannot be doubted. 
When one questions the validity of their own sense perceptions, the perceptions are undermined, 
but the act of doubting is not—doubting necessarily occurs. Additionally, if the act of doubting 
cannot be doubted, then the existence of the act of doubt must be true. This must hold true for 
acts of thought in general: if something is thought, at least that act of thought must exist. 
Descartes reasons that the “proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true every time it is 
pronounced, or conceived in my mind, by me” (Descartes 2018 (or. 1641), VII, 25)11.  
However, a bit further in the second meditation, Descartes asks how long the proposition “I am, I 
exist” remains certain? His response is “as long as I think”. (Descartes 2018 (or. 1641), VII 27)12. 
 
10 “[...] Différence interne, et qui rapporte a priori l’être et la pensée l’un à l’autre” (DR, 116). 
11 “[…] hoc pronuntiatum, Ego sum, ego existo, quoties a me profertur, vel mente concipitur, necessario esse verum” 
(Descartes 2018 (or. 1641), VII, 27). 
12 “Ego sum, ego existo ; certum est. Quandiu autem ? Nempe quandiu cogito ; nam forte etiam fieri posset, si 




Therefore, the act of thought proves or determines the existence of the doubter. The I think 
(cogito) determines the existence of the thinker, the I am (sum). The act of thought guarantees the 
existence of the thinker. The thinker is not what is certain in the beginning, but the existence of 
the thinker is discerned by Descartes from the cogito. This leads Descartes to declare the thinker 
to be a res cogitans, a “thinking thing.” (Descartes 2018 (or. 1641), VII, 27.) 
For Kant, Descartes errs in his argument. The crucial mistake occurs when Descartes moves from 
the cogito (“I think”) straight to assert sum (“I am”). The cogito is something determined, a 
thinking thing. Whereas, sum, is something undetermined. In Deleuze’s reading, Kant’s criticism 
is to go straight from determined existence to undetermined existence (DR, 116, see also Voss 
2013, 126–7). We begin with something determined (I think) and before continuing to something 
undetermined (I am), we need to render the undetermined determinable. To be determinable for 
Kant, the object needs to be given in time. 
Deleuze’s reading is based on Kant’s discussion of the paradox of inner sense (DR, 116)13.  In the 
second section of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant discusses this paradox. First, inner sense is 
“the intuition of our self and our inner state” (CRP A33/B49). That is, inner sense is what we 
attain through introspection, when we delve into what our mind is processing or experiencing. 
This is distinct from outer sense, which Kant defines as “the subjective condition of sensibility, 
under which alone outer intuition is possible for us” (CPR A26/B42). In broad strokes, outer 
sense refers to objects we encounter in experience, whereas inner sense refers to what we 
encounter in the state of our mind. For Kant, “[t]ime is nothing other than the form of inner 
sense” (CPR A33/B49). As I introspect, what appears to me are my inner states in a succession, 
or in a temporal order. 
Now we can turn to the paradox of inner sense. What happens when the thinking subject tries to 
think itself? The thinker turns inwards to introspect its own state. Does the subject attain itself or 
something else in inner sense? Indeed, Kant answers that the thinking subject can only attain 
oneself “like other phenomena, not as I am for the understanding but rather as I appear to myself, 
this is no more and no less difficult than how I can be an object for myself in general” (CPR, 
 





B155). The thinking subject thinks itself as an object, therefore, it is not “as I am for the 
understanding”. The subject only attains itself as an object, not as the subject of thought. 
In the passage, Kant distinguishes between what “I am for the understanding” (CPR, B155) and 
what the act of thought attains, the “appearance” in inner sense. The appearance in inner sense 
comes as given under the form of time. Therefore, the thinking subject attains its own apparition 
in time. “Hence we must order the determinations of inner sense as appearances in time in just the 
same way as we order those of outer sense in space (CPR, B156). Just as outer objects are given 
in time, so too, the object the cogito attains is not itself as the I of the understanding, but as the I 
given in time. 
Deleuze prefers to introduce his reading of Kant’s criticism via the three terms determination, 
determinable and determined. Kant uses these as well, in the beginning of the B-edition 
Paralogisms, where he discusses the mistaken arguments of rational psychologists (CPR, 
A341/B399). “It is not the consciousness of the determining self, but only that of the 
determinable self, i.e., of my inner intuition […], that is the object.” (CPR, B407). So, the object 
of introspection is determinable inner sense and not the determining I of the cogito.  
The cogito, the determining self, encounters in inner sense the determinable self as given in time. 
For Deleuze, this means that when the determining meets the determinable, it does not meet 
itself. Here we see why Deleuze prefers the terms undetermined, determinable and determining 
for introducing Kant’s criticism of Descartes. Descartes moves from determining thinking, 
cogito, straight to undetermined being, sum. For Deleuze, Kant’s critique amounts to saying that 
we need a third mediating term, the determinable. To pass between these two, the cogito as 
determining attains itself in introspection as determinable, given in time, and from there we may 
logically move to the undetermined, the sum. (see Lord 2012, 91.) 
For Deleuze, this means that the cogito cannot encounter its own being qua being, but as 
something already different from itself. Kant’s critique against Descartes amounts to  
the discovery of Difference, no more as the empirical difference between two 
determinations, but as the transcendental Difference between THE 




difference which separates, but as the internal Difference which relates a priori 
being and thinking to one another (DR, 116)14.  
An external difference would be the difference between two separate empirical things, such as 
two books on the table. However, in the case of the undetermined sum and the determining 
cogito, the difference is internal, because the cogito tries to attain itself and cannot encounter 
itself per se, but only as itself given in time (see Lord 2012, 91–4; Sauvagnargues 2010, 23–24). 
In the chapter on Kant of Essays Critical and Clinical (1993), Deleuze writes that “[t]he Self is in 
time and does not cease from changing: it is a passive, or more precisely receptive, self which 
experiences the changes in time.” (Deleuze 1993, 43)15. Here, Deleuze departs from Kant who 
maintains that time is the form of inner sense—he does not go on to say that the self would be in 
time. For Deleuze, time is not just the condition of all inner sense but that time is the “form of 
everything that changes and moves, but it is an unchanging form and does not change.” (Deleuze 
1993, 42)16. Deleuze’s subject is in time, and this means that it is susceptible to change. Deleuze 
designates this I, which contains the internal difference, as the “fractured I”: “the I is traversed by 
a fracture: it is fractured by the pure and empty form of time” (DR, 117; see Lord 2012, 94)17.  
Deleuze continues that “my undetermined existence cannot be determined in any other way but in 
time, as the existence of a phenomenon, of a phenomenal subject, passive or receptive, appearing 
in time" (DR, 116)18. Therefore, the cogito attains itself only as a passive subject. This is 
suggested by Kant as well: “[…] through inner sense we intuit ourselves only as we are internally 
affected by our selves, i.e., as far as inner intuition is concerned we cognize our own subject only 
as appearance but not in accordance with what it is in itself.” (CPR, B156). In this passage Kant 
distinguishes between inner sense as an appearance and the subject in “what it is in itself”. The 
 
14 “[...] la découverte de la Différence, non plus comme différence empirique entre les deux déterminations, mais 
Différence transcendantale entre LA détermination et ce qu’elle détermine – non plus comme différence extérieure 
qui sépare, mais Différence interne, et qui rapporte a priori l’être et la pensée l’un à l’autre.” (DR, 116). 
15 “Le Moi est dans le temps et ne cesse de changer : c’est un moi passif ou plutôt réceptif qui éprouve des 
changements dans le temps” (Deleuze 1993, 43). 
16 “Il est la forme de tout ce qui change et se meut, mais c’est une forme immuable et qui ne change pas.” (Deleuze 
1993, 42) 
17 “[…] le JE est comme traversé d’une fêlure : il est fêlé par la forme pure et vide du temps” (DR, 117), see also 
Deleuze 1993, 43. 
18 “[...] mon existence indéterminée ne peut être déterminée que dans le temps, comme l’existence d’un phénomène, 




determinable self (given in inner sense), is “internally affected” by the thinking subject. This is 
reminiscent of Deleuze’s description of the subject as passive and receptive.  
For Deleuze, this means that the self determines its existence as passive, not as active: “The Self 
is an act (I think) which determines actively my existence (I am), but which cannot determine it 
but in time, as the existence of a passive, receptive and changing self, and which only represents 
the activity of its own thinking.” (Deleuze 1993, 43)19. So, the self determines its existence in 
time only as “passive, receptive and changing”. It is not determined as an active self. Instead, the 
activity of the thinker is only represented, not experienced, according to Deleuze20.  
The spontaneity of thinking is, for Deleuze, something the passive self experiences “like an Other 
[Autre] in himself” (DR, 117).  Deleuze sees that the passive self correlates with an “I” in the “I 
am” and in the “I think”. This has a dire consequence as thinking is “an affectation of a passive 
self which feels [sent] that its own thinking, its own intelligence, by which, it says I, exercises in 
himself and on himself, not by himself.” (DR, 117)21 This means that, at bottom, thinking is an 
affectation on the self, it is not truly its “own” activity but something Other, which traverses it. 
The internal difference Deleuze locates disrupts one strong intuition usually taken for granted: 
thinking is my thinking (in chapter 4, we will see that Deleuze’s transcendent thinking 
corresponds to this kind of thinking). 
In summary, Deleuze traces a reading of Kant, where the thinker discovers its own internal 
difference when attempting to attain itself. The thinking self is indeed traversed by the fracturing 
line of time, as the form of change. Deleuze refers to this thinker as the “fractured I”. Kant 
himself would not agree with this reading22. In the Critique of Pure Reason, he is clear about the 
relation between time and the transcendental subject: “Time is therefore merely a subjective 
 
19 “Le Je est un acte (je pense) qui détermine activement mon existence (je suis), mais ne peut la déterminer que dans 
le temps, comme l’existence d’un moi passif, réceptif et changeant qui se représente seulement l’activité de sa propre 
pensée” (Deleuze 1993, 43). 
20 Daniela Voss interprets this along the same lines: “[b]y defining time as a form of interiority, Kant introduced a 
fundamental split in the subject. The Kantian subject is torn between the form of spontaneity, that is the ‘I think’ 
which accompanies all concept production and guarantees the unity of synthesis, and the empirical self which 
experiences the effects of thought rather than initiating the act of thought itself.” (Voss 2013, 215.) 
21 “[…] une affection d’un moi passif qui sent que sa propre pensée, sa propre intelligence, ce par quoi il dit JE, 
s’exerce en lui et sur lui, non pas par lui” (DR, 117). 
22 Deleuze is well-known for imaginative readings. For instance, Anne Sauvagnargues characterized this reading as 





condition of our (human) intuition […], and in itself, outside the subject, is nothing.” (CPR 
A35/B51). For Deleuze, Kant does not take seriously the discovery he has made (see Lord 2012, 
94). This reading of Kant’s criticism of Descartes points towards three things. First, a conception 
of internal difference (in the case of the cogito, time as the form under which it attains itself as 
determinable). Second, how this internal difference engenders the passive subject the cogito 
encounters in inner sense. Third, a conception of thinking which is not the thinking subject’s own 
thinking, but something engendered in its passivity, as it opens to its internal difference. Later in 
chapter 4, I am going to show how Deleuze’s transcendent thinking turns out to be just this very 
kind of thinking. 
1.2. Time, Difference and Repetition 
In this subchapter, we will uncover Deleuze’s motivation’s for his conception of internal 
difference and hidden repetition. Later, this will help us in situating Deleuze’s conception of 
transcendent thinking within the overall project of Difference and Repetition.  
According to Deleuze, difference has always been subjugated to something else throughout the 
history of philosophy (see especially the first chapter of Difference and Repetition for Deleuze’s 
critique). For example, when identity is taken to bring about a difference, we say that two things 
are different because they involve different identities. For instance, two glasses on the table are 
different because the other has identity ‘A’ and the other ‘B’, and because their identities are 
different, they must be different. Deleuze argues the same happens with Aristotle. When the 
genera of ‘animal’ is divided into rational and non-rational, the other branch is the species ‘man’, 
and the other ‘non-rational animals’. This act of division becomes the instigator of difference. 
(DR, 45–6; see Somers-Hall 2013, 23–26.) In both cases, difference is something secondary and 
derived. 
For Deleuze, difference is the more fundamental concept, whereas that of identity is derived. He 
writes that, “[a]ll identities are simulated, produced like an optical ‘effect’ by the more profound 
play of difference and repetition” (DR, 1)23. Things like identities and resemblances do exist for 
Deleuze—he does not deny this. What he objects to, is taking them to be fundamental.  
 
23 “Toutes les identités ne sont que simulées, produites comme un ‘effet’ optique, par un jeu plus profond qui est 




However, to understand internal difference and hidden repetition, Deleuze’s conception of time is 
the key. In the previous subchapter, the cogito was exposed to its internal difference when it 
surrendered to time. Anne Sauvagnargues’s writes that time is, for Deleuze, “the transcendental 
difference, the condition of the determination of all differenciation [différenciation], within 
thinking itself (Sauvagnargues 2010, 24, my translation). Focusing on time will help explain the 
link between internal difference and hidden repetition. This amounts to Deleuze following 
through with his reading of Kantian time24.  
In the second lecture of the course Kant: Synthesis and Time, Deleuze explores the significance 
of Kant’s idea of time. He refers to two conceptions of time, which Kant rejected (Deleuze 
1978b, see also Voss 2013, 213–5). Both come from classical philosophy but Deleuze takes them 
to sum up different pre-critical views. The first view Deleuze has in mind, is that time is the 
measure of change25, the “number of change.” Time provides a unit by which change can be 
measured. (Deleuze 1978b.) For instance, if someone drops a ball, a measurable number of 
seconds pass, as it reaches the floor. According to this view, time can be divided into units, and 
movements and other changes can be measured by these units of time. 
For Deleuze, the underlying conception of time in this view is that time is made up of succession 
of instants (Deleuze 1978b). Instants pass and they are succeeded. One instant, the ball is in the 
person’s hand, the next it is released, and after several more instants, it hits the ground. Time is 
defined by the succession of instants, but these instants themselves are demarcated by change. In 
Deleuze’s words, time is “subordinated” to change. (Deleuze 1978b.) If nothing changes, no 
instant lapses. Time is thus carved out of the succession of instants and anchored to movement or 
to some other change (such as the deterioration of an onion on the bottom shelf of the fridge—an 
example of qualitative change).  
Deleuze takes this view to be mistaken, since there is an underlying problem in the need for time 
to be based on succession. If time is the succession of instants, it would itself need another time 
 
24 Deleuze’s philosophy of time is a complicated topic in itself. For example, James Williams (2011) has written a 
monograph on time in Difference and Reptition (1968) and Logic of Sense (1969). Here, I will limit my scope to 
what is important for my thesis. 
25 The first view is suggested by Aristotle in the fourth book of Physics, as he describes time as the number of 
movement: “[t]ime is: the number of change in respect of before and after” (Aristotle 2008, 219a30–219b5). Deleuze 




to succeed in, and this another time would, in turn, need a further time to succeed in, ad 
infinitum. (Deleuze 1978b, see also Deleuze 1993, 42.) In the lecture of March 14, Deleuze states 
that this is because succession is only a “mode” of time, and therefore we cannot use it to define 
time as such. For Deleuze, Kant rejects the view that time is subordinated to movement and 
defined as succession. (Deleuze 1978b.) As time becomes the necessary form of all intuition 
(CPR, A35/B51), time is no longer subjugated to movement. Instead, time becomes the 
conditioning of all things, even perceived movements and changes. 
The second conception of time rejected by Kant is the Ancient notion of cyclic time. In cyclical 
time, time is like a circle, revolving around an axis, repeating everything like it was in the 
previous cycles. (Deleuze 1978b; see Voss 2013, 213–5.) This means that the world follows a 
pre-established order, and things repeat themselves endlessly26. Deleuze quotes Hamlet to show 
how this conception of cyclical time is undermined by Kant: “time is out of joint” (act 1, scene 
5).27 In the cosmological conception of time, time revolves around an axis: the heavenly bodies 
perpetuate a regular circular motion, repeating the exact same path again and again28. With Kant, 
time is, for the first time, unhinged: it becomes a straight line, instead of a circle. (Deleuze 
1978b.) Time no longer revolves around the same axis, repeating.  
In sum, Kant’s departs from his predecessors in his conception of time, according to Deleuze, as 
time is dissociated from movement and succession and broken out of a cycle of repetition. Time 
becomes dissociated from movement, when it becomes the condition of movement and 
succession, not the other way around. As time is no longer dependent upon the cycle of nature, 
nature becomes dependent upon time. (Deleuze 1978b.)  
However, Deleuze takes Kant’s reconceptualization beyond what Kant would himself take it. 
Kant insisted on time being the “subjective condition of our (human) intuition […], and in itself, 
outside the subject, is nothing” (CPR A35/B51). For Deleuze, these discoveries mean that time is 
the “form of everything that changes and moves, but it is an unchanging form and does not 
 
26 Deleuze associates this type of cyclical notion of time to Plato’s Timaeus (Deleuze 1978b, see Voss 2013. 213–5). 
27 Deleuze discusses this line on the lectures on March 14 and 21, and again in the fourth chapter of Essays Critical 
and Clinical (1993), to illustrate the major turning point Kant introduced into philosophy of time. 
28 I assume that Deleuze would take Scholastic views of time to involve a Christian world view. It has a beginning 
point as God creates the world and our current situation would be somewhere after the Fall. The circle would come 
to an end with the last Judgement. However, I do not know whether Deleuze discusses this possibility, nor examples 




change” (Deleuze 1993, 42).29 What we perceive in experience is constantly changing: for 
instance, an object of experience moves across our field of vision, a flower in the vase 
deteriorates at an imperceptible rate and so on. For Deleuze, time is the form under which change 
manifests, or in other words, time is the form of change. 
The concept of eternal return30, as it is developed by Deleuze, shows the interdependency of 
difference and repetition and their connection to time. “It is not the same which returns, it is not 
the similar [semblable] which returns, but the Same is the returning of that which returns, that is, 
of the Different. The similar is the returning of that which returns, that is, of the Dissimilar.” (DR, 
384; see Voss 2013, 87.)31 What returns is the different, not the same. This is because everything 
is in constant change. What returns is not the same, but the different, different from what it was. 
For example, when I observe a dying flower in a vase from day to day, it returns (repeats itself), 
but as its deterioration continues, it comes back as different from what it was32.  
In eternal return, the consequences of Kant’s temporal revolution are followed through:  
Time has to be lived and conceived as time out of joint. Time made into a 
straight line which eliminates without pity those who engage in it, those who 
arrive at the scene in this way, those who repeat but only once for all. […] 
those who repeat identically are eliminated. They only repeat once. (DR, 
381.)33  
The time of Deleuze’s eternal return has broken out of the circle of the cyclical conception. In it, 
the identical is not repeated but eliminated before it can repeat itself. Time is no longer a circle in 
 
29 “Il est la forme de tout ce qui change et se meut, mais c’est une forme immuable et qui ne change pas” (Deleuze 
1993, 42). 
30 Already in Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962), Deleuze discusses a preliminary interpretation of eternal return (e.g. 
Deleuze 2010, 28).  
31 “Ce n’est pas le même qui revient, ce n’est pas le semblable qui revient, mais le Même est le revenir de ce qui 
revient, c’est-à-dire du Différent, le semblable est le revenir de ce qui revient, c’est-à-dire du Dissimilaire” (DR 
384). 
32 Deleuze is here also thinking about the way contemporary science of his time saw the world. Even if no observable 
changes occur, on the level particle physics, there is a constant change in the positions of the different particles, as, 
for instance the electrons circle around the atom they orbit. There is always a level, on which we could potentially 
observe change. 
33 “Il faut vivre et concevoir le temps hors de ses gonds, le temps mis en ligne droite qui élimine impitoyablement 
ceux qui s’y engagent, qui viennent ainsi sur la scène, mais qui ne répètent qu’une fois pour toutes. [...] qui répètent 




which the same repeats but breaks out into a straight line. Time is the form of change, and as 
such, all things are subordinated to it.  
The repetition of eternal return, repetition of that which is different, is in fact the hidden 
repetition we have mentioned. As an object of experience appears to us as unchanged, for 
example, a book on the table is repeated looking the same from one moment to the next, it is 
repeated materially. However, behind or below this apparent repetition lies the hidden repetition, 
repetition of the dissimilar in eternal return (DR, 2). As the internal difference forces its bearer to 
repeat itself as different, “[t]he difference is between two repetitions” (DR, 104). That is, as 
something returns, the internal difference forces it to return as different to what it was. This 
happens between the repetition of the seemingly same, and the hidden repetition of the dissimilar. 
In this way, internal difference produces the effect of persisting objects via the hidden repetition.  
1.3. Three Syntheses of Time and Passive Subjectivity 
We saw how Deleuze associates the continuities we observe in experience to material repetition. 
However, Deleuze also describes how passive subjectivity arises through two syntheses of time. 
Since no identity is stable, he needs to establish the possibility of (at least seeming) continuity in 
subjects by showing how they are produced or constituted. The passive subject is a result of two 
syntheses of time: habit and memory34 (see Voss 2013, 219).  
Deleuze’s description of the constitution of passive subjectivity should be read in contrast to 
Kant. Whereas Kant is interested in the conditions of possible experience, Deleuze is interested in 
illuminating the conditions of real experience (DR, 94). Levi Bryant notes that Deleuze wants “to 
determine the conditions under which receptivity is itself possible” (Bryant 2008, 9). Deleuze is 
not interested in describing how a transcendental subject works, but instead, how concrete, 
contingent subjectivity emerges35. The perspective shifts, as the conditions of real experience 
 
34 The third synthesis of time in Difference and Repetition is eternal return, which I already introduced in the 
previous subchapter, but it effectuates the disruption of the passive subject, as I show below. Three similar syntheses 
are discussed in Deleuze’s Logique of Sense (1969), and his first collaborative work with Félix Guattari, Anti-
Oedipus (1972). However, there seem to be some discontinuity in these accounts (for instance, in Anti-Oedipus, the 
three syntheses seem to have similar functions, but their order differs). I do not have the space to discuss the breath 
of these similarities here. For more on syntheses of time, see especially Faulkner (2004) and Williams (2011).  
35 Levi Bryant notes that the production of receptivity “[…]is not the work of a sovereign subject, but is a production 
that occurs at the level of being itself” (Bryant 2008, 9). Daniela Voss writes, “Deleuze demands that a 




should “not be larger than what they condition” (DR, 94, see also Bryant 2008, 61). This means 
that Deleuze does not want to treat emergence of experience from an abstract perspective 
(conditions of possible experience), but rather, the conditions of concrete and singular 
experiences (see Bryant 2008, 62). It is for this reason, that investigating the production of 
passive subjectivity is important for Deleuze. 
The first synthesis of time is “habit”. It constitutes a lived present (“présent vecu” or living 
present, “présent vivant”, as Deleuze occasionally writes). Deleuze discusses an example from 
David Hume. When a mind observes a series of As and Bs alternating, ABAB…, the mind takes 
the particulars of the past, and forms an expectation of what is to come. A follows B and after B, 
comes A, and so on. (DR, 96–99; see Voss 2013, 219–21.) This is the expectation a human 
subject listening to the ticks and tocks of a clock, forming the belief that their alternation will 
perpetuate. 
Deleuze continues that “[…] the contraction designates also the fusion of these successive tick-
tocks in a contemplative soul [âme contemplative]” (DR, 101)36. However, this does not suggest 
a pan psychism, a vitalism, nor does it only refer to human subjects. The contemplative soul 
refers to the point of contraction, the unit of being which is at the centre of the repetition. “A soul 
must be attributed to the heart, muscles, nerves and cells, but a contemplative soul, whose whole 
role is to contract a habit” (ibid.).37 The contemplative soul contracts a habit or, so to speak, 
enacts the first synthesis of time.  
Different contemplations involve different durations. The pulse of their rhythms differs. (DR 
105.) For instance, the heart of a hummingbird races tenfold that of a human walking. Both are 
contemplative souls, which have contracted the habit of flexing their muscular tissue pumping 
blood through the veins of the organism. Deleuze writes that, “[…] it is maybe an ‘irony’ to say 
that all is contemplation, even rocks and antlers, animals and men” (DR, 102)38. The synthesis of 
 
the possibility of experience. A viewpoint of genesis has to be substituted for a viewpoint of conditioning.” (Voss 
2013, 75.) 
36 “Mais la contraction désigne aussi la fusion des tic-tac successifs dans une âme contemplative” (Deleuze 2013 (or. 
1968), 101). 
37 “Il faut attribuer une âme au cœur, aux muscles, aux nerfs, aux cellules, mais une âme contemplative dont tout le 
rôle est de contracter l’habitude” (DR, 101). 
38 “[…] et c’est peut-être une ‘ironie’ de dire que tout est contemplation, même les rochers et les bois, les animaux et 




habit is ubiquitous. Rock is a contraction of chemical elements in a similar way as a plank of 
wood or an organism is. However, the rhythm of contractions differs again, as a rock is formed 
through millions of years, whereas a human perishes in decades. In this way, the syntheses are 
not only productive of human and nonhuman subjectivity, but also continuity evidenced on the 
level of being in general, namely in the form of persisting objects. 
There are two sides to the synthesis of habit, first is the perceptual or receptive, and the second 
the organic39. “The perceived quality merges with the contraction of elementary excitations” 
(DR, 99; see Voss 2013, 219)40. For example, when we contemplate the sky, the elementary 
excitations of different shades of colour are contracted into the blue of the sky. We form 
expectations about the continuity of a quality based on many small perceptions. On the level of 
the contemplative soul, it too contracts particulars to anticipate continuity in what follows. This 
contraction is the basic principle of the emergence of receptivity, or the perceptual side of the 
first synthesis. 
The human subject is made up of “thousands of passive syntheses, which make us up organically. 
At the same time, we are habits, as we contract, but we contract by contemplation.” (DR, 101, see 
Voss 2013, 222.)41 Organisms are structurally composed of contracting-contemplating selves, or 
different contemplative souls. This is the organic side of the first synthesis. “We are contracted 
water, earth, light and air, not only before recognizing or representing them, but before sensing 
them. Every organism is in its receptive and perceptive elements, as well as in its viscera, a sum 
of contraction, retentions and expectations.” (DR, 99.)42 Organisms are networks of 
contemplative souls engaged in contraction-contemplation. As Deleuze suggests, their primordial 
receptivity is functioning before any representative. 
 
39 John Protevi (2012) distinguishes organic and perceptual syntheses from one another (240–1), a distinction 
sometimes overlooked altogether in secondary literature. I am inclined to see them as possibly co-manifesting. 
However, a more thorough discussion of this nuance lies beyond the scope of my Master’s thesis. 
40 “La qualité sentie se confond avec la contraction d’excitations élémentaires […]” (DR, 99). 
41 “[…] mais d’abord les habitudes primaires que nous sommes, les milliers de synthèses passives qui nous 
composent organiquement. A la fois, c’est en contractant que nous sommes des habitudes, mais c’est par 
contemplation que nous contractons” (DR, 101). 
42 “Nous sommes de l’eau, de la terre, de la lumière et de l’air contractés, non seulement avant de les reconnaître ou 
de les représenter, mais avant de les sentir. Tout organisme est, dans ses éléments réceptifs et perceptifs, mais aussi 




The two sides of the first synthesis “refer” to one another: “in the constituting passivity, the 
perceptive syntheses refer [renvoient] to organic syntheses, as the sensibility of the senses, to the 
primary sensibility that we are” (DR, 99)43. The verb ‘renvoyer’ also means ‘to reflect’ and this 
highlights the reciprocal nature of the perceptual and organic side of the syntheses. Neither of 
these sides of the synthesis of habit is primary to the other.  
What is fundamental, is the internal difference which generates the changes, the return of the 
dissimilar—the hidden repetition. The synthesis of habit gives us a primordial receptivity 
unanchored into a preestablished model of sensibility (such as the colour sight of humans). 
Instead, receptivity is contraction on the level of being. In an organism, the organic side of the 
synthesis means that it is composed of an organization of different contemplative souls 
contracting habits (see Protevi 2012). Together the perceptive and organic side of the syntheses 
make up “the primary sensibility that we are” (DR, 99). In this way, different perceptual 
capacities of organisms arise from theses systems of passive syntheses. 
In the synthesis of habit, the past and future are dimensions of the lived present (DR, 105; see 
Voss 2013, 200). Past instants are “retained in the contraction”, and the future lies in the 
anticipation of the contraction. (DR, 97). In other words, different cases of the past are contracted 
into the present and an expectation about the future is formed. Both the past, and the future are 
present in the present. In this way, we contract past sunrises into an expectation about 
tomorrow’s sunrise. However, this happens to the passive subject “before all memory and 
reflexion” (DR, 97)44. 
The synthesis of habit constitutes the two dimensions of the passive subject: its receptive 
capacity, and its structural organization. In this way, “[t]he passive Self is not defined simply by 
the receptivity, that is the capacity to feel sensations, but by the contracting contemplation which 
constitutes the organism itself even before constituting its sensations” (DR, 107)45.  Habit also 
 
43 “Mais, dans l’ordre de la passivité constituante, les synthèses perceptives renvoient à des synthèses organiques, 
comme la sensibilité des sens, à une sensibilité primaire que nous sommes” (DR, 99). 
44  “[…] précédant toute mémoire et toute reflexion” (Deleuze 2013 (or. 1968), 97). 
45 “Le Moi passif ne se définit pas simplement par la réceptivité, c’est-à-dire par la capacité d’éprouver des 
sensations, mais par la contemplation contractante qui constitue l’organisme lui-même avant d’en constituer les 




constitutes the present as a contraction of past and future. In this way, the synthesis of habit is the 
condition of concrete experience. 
These contemplating souls form a “system of a dissolved self” (DR, 107). Syntheses of habit, or 
contraction-contemplations of a contemplating souls, make up a system. This system constitutes a 
centre of subjectivity, such as a human subject, or another psychic system. In this way, Deleuze 
does not presuppose a whole, an empirical subject. Instead, with the notion of the synthesis of 
habit and the way it engenders complex systems, he explains how subjectivity arises from being 
in time, being under the form of change. 
The second synthesis of time is that of memory. The first synthesis of habit is paramount to 
subjectivity, so, I will be brief here. Deleuze is not referring to an active human memory, a 
retainer of impressions of past experiences46. This active memory relies on the synthesis of habit 
(DR, 108). For there to be something to be recalled, it needs to be retained in the contraction of 
the lived present and in this way, habit functions as the condition of the active use of memory. 
Without the succession created by the synthesis, nothing from the past could be retained or 
recalled in the present.  
The second synthesis of time, memory, provides the being of the past, or the pure past, which 
grounds the present (DR, 108–109; see Voss 2013, 224). The present instants need something to 
pass in. This cannot be time itself, according to Deleuze, because if the present would pass in 
time, this time would also need another time to pass in (DR, 108, see also the preceding 
subchapter). The present can pass on the condition of “the pure element of past, as the past in 
general, as the a priori past, so that the ancient present finds itself reproducible, and the actual 
present reflects itself.” (DR, 110)47. So, for the present, which has already passed, to be recalled, 
there needs to be a pure past. The pure past functions as the condition of the present. 
 
46 Or in Deleuze’s words, “[…] the active synthesis of memory constitutes it [i.e. the present] as the aggregation 
[“emboîtement] of presents themselves” (DR, 110)46. 
47 “C’est par l’élément pur du passé, comme passé en général, comme passé a priori, que tel ancien présent se trouve 




Deleuze introduces the pure past through four paradoxes he ascribes to Henri Bergson’s Matter 
and Memory. I will limit my scope here to the fourth paradox, Bergson’s cone48 (DR, 112). If we 
were to imagine a pointed cone, its point would be the present and the rest of the cone would 
make up the entirety of the past. Each segment of the cone includes the whole of the past in a 
certain state of contraction or relaxation. (ibid.) The segments do not form a succession of 
instants moving away from the tip of the cone, but each segment is the past in its totality. As we 
move away from the tip, the entirety of the past becomes more relaxed, more robust in its details. 
(ibid.; see Voss 2013, 226.) If we think about a subjective memory, the state of affairs it 
represents, we can imagine the same memory with a different collection of details. If I recall a 
picnic with some friends, one level would be to remark that it was June and the weather was 
pleasant. Another would be to recall more details, such as the spot where we sat, how sunlight 
streamed through the canopy, and so on.  
However, the cone here is not the retainer conception of empirical memory. The cone is what 
works as its foundation: the pure past, an ontological conception of the past, which includes all 
the states of affairs that have passed. A recalled past instant is but a small portion from a specific 
segment in a specific state of contraction. The cone includes details about the past events 
(presumably) up to an infinity of details. The active memory of a subject presupposes the pure 
past (DR, 112). The pure past is not time, as time is for Deleuze the form of change. The pure 
past is not a present, either, but as each present passes, they are added to this ontological, pure 
past. The present is produced through the contraction of the first synthesis on the basis of this 
pure past. So, the first synthesis of time created the lived present, and the second, the past in 
which the lived present can pass.  
The third synthesis of time Deleuze introduces is the eternal return (see 1.1.). Through the first 
synthesis, passive subjectivity is constituted and the second synthesis grounds the first one. 
Together the two explain the constitution of passive subjectivity from being in time, under the 
form of change. The flux of change is oriented towards streams of continuity, which organize the 
passive subject. Eternal return is the image of the incessant change. What returns is not the Same 
 
48 The first three paradoxes are 1) contemporaneity of the past with the present it was, 2) coexistence of the past with 





but the Dissimilar. This means that only change is truly constant, only time remains constant, as 
the eternal form of change. In relation to the two syntheses, eternal return disrupts the continuity 
they create49. It breaks the continuity of the passive subject by exposing it to its internal 
difference, by forcing it to repeat, in the hidden way, as something different than what it was 
before. Repetition in the eternal return is not continuity, but “the dissolution of all preliminary 
identities” (DR, 260).  
At this point, I will discuss Deleuze’s ideas of internal difference and repetition in relation to a 
classic problem of identity: Theseus’s ship50. According to the story, the ship of the mythological 
Greek hero was left to rot on a beach. To repair the damage, the ship’s planks were taken out one 
by one and replaced with new ones until each part of the ship had been exchanged. The 
philosophical problem arises when we ask is the ship still the same, or in other words, does it 
have the same identity as it did in the beginning? If not, at which point does it change its identity? 
For Deleuze, the identity of the ship is an effect of internal difference and the hidden repetition 
linked to it.  
We can first think about the ship as it is rotting on the beach. The system of the ship is a complex 
system of different contraction-contemplations. Its parts have been contracted together by the 
shipbuilders. For instance, each plank has been moved to its place and attached by hammer blows 
and other means. Further, the particular objects are contractions of materials. For example, nails 
are contracted minerals, which have undergone changes such as being heated (relaxation, 
becoming instable) and being cast (contraction, becoming more stable). Even the materials of the 
parts are contractions, such as the iron of the nail is a contraction of molecules. All in all, the ship 
is a complex system of contemplation-contractions. 
What’s more, as the ship persists in time, its composition is in a slow process of relaxation. The 
ship as an object, is itself a contraction-contemplation, a synthesis of habit, which has its own 
rhythm. For instance, the molecular basis of the particular objects (e.g. plank and nails) becomes 
less stable as erosion slowly decomposes the wood. When the wood gives in, the contraction-
contemplation, which held it in place is relaxed—eventually the plank might fall of and the 
 
49 Daniela Voss stresses “that the subject or rather subjective structures are something that emerge, transform, 
dissolve and are always renewed through the temporal syntheses” (Voss 2013, 251). 




composition of the system of the ship altered. In other words, the ship’s synthesis of habit 
progresses towards a relaxation, and this effectuates its deterioration. 
For Deleuze, this process of decay is due to the ship’s internal difference. On the material level, 
the ship repeats itself as perceptually the same from one moment to another. The internal 
difference drives the contraction-contemplation of the ship to perpetuate hidden repetitions, small 
changes leading to its slow decay. This is the ship’s eternal return, as it returns as different. As 
the ship is in the midst of its own eternal return, the ship is in a slow process of decay, as its 
syntheses are progression towards a relaxation. 
Now we can turn to the original puzzle. For Deleuze, there is no fundamental difference between 
the decay of the ship we examined above and the process of repairing the ship. The processes 
unravel at different rhythms. For instance, a renovator removes an entire plank, whereas decay 
would take years to go through it. The way the ship changes is also different. As the ship decays, 
it is wholly deteriorated. In the case of renovation, the composition of the ship is renewed, and its 
condition ameliorated. No matter, the same slow change, decay, in its composition necessarily 
continues even after repairing it. However, in both processes, the changes do not result from the 
identity of the ship. They result from the internal difference of the ship, and the hidden repetitions 
it endures51. 
In this way, the original paradox only refers to a similar process of change observed on the level 
of human perception: the exchange of individual planks one at a time. However, on the sub-
representational level, we see that even after renovation, the ship is still in the same process of 
change. However, the rhythm of the contractions might be altered if the new planks would be 
made of another kind of wood, for instance. The process of the dissolution of the identity of the 
ship remains constant, and as such, the puzzle about its identity only covers the more 
fundamental play of internal difference and hidden repetition. 
 
51 This is more straightforward when erosion and decay enact the changes. However, even when human renovators 
work on the ship, they always proceed to modify the ship in some way. They take one element of the whole and 
replace it with a new part. In 2.2. we are going to discuss virtual Ideas. Here, we would need to refer to the ship’s 
virtual Idea, as a virtual multiplicity containing all the possible states of the system. This means that the virtual Idea 
of the ship would already contain all the possible changes the renovators would be able to effectuate. As such, the 
renovation would be an actualization of the virtual Idea of the ship—an actualization in which it would progress 




A similar puzzle pertains to human (and non-human) subjects as well. The molecules of a human 
are slowly recycled with those found in nutrients. According to an urban legend (we can assume 
valid for the sake of a thought experiment), every seven years, all molecules in a human would 
have been exchanged with others and there would be left no molecules that composed the human 
seven years ago52. This poses an analogous problem to the ship of Theseus. 
For Deleuze, the human, as a passive subject would be constituted as a complex network of 
different syntheses of habit, contraction-contemplations. As we have seen, these passive 
syntheses of time would constitute, due to their perceptual side, the primordial passive 
receptivity. Due to their organic side, they would constitute the organic composition of the 
passive subject. As such, the system of the passive subject would be subject to a slow change, the 
exchange of the molecules making it up. This would be a result of the hidden repetition 
engendered by its internal difference. 
In this chapter, I introduced Deleuze’s motivation for a conception of internal difference and 
hidden repetition connected to it. The puzzle of the ship of Theseus highlighted how a classic 
problem of metaphysics finds a novel solution with Deleuze’s philosophy of difference. We have 
also seen that time, as the form of change, functions as the internal difference of thinking53—
something which I will explore in more depth in chapter 4. Additionally, we saw how Deleuze 
puts his notion of time to use in proposing three syntheses of time, which constitute the 
production and disruption of the passive subject.  
2. The Ontological Scheme of Difference and Repetition 
In the everyday, human subjects encounter persistent objects, which remain constant from one 
moment to the next. In the previous chapter, we saw how Deleuze’s internal difference, time as 
the form of change, engenders continuity via two syntheses of time. However, what we saw was a 
 
52 If we would not accept presupposing the legend about the period of seven years to be valid, we could assume that a 
significant amount of the constituting molecular material of humans would be recycled in a period of X years. This 
would no longer be analogous to the original puzzle of Theseus’s ship, but could work as a similar puzzle about 
personal identity. 
53 Daniela Voss sums up the importance of Deleuze’s philosophy of difference in a similar fashion: “The task will be 
to establish a concept of difference and to restore difference to being and thought. Difference in being operates as the 
individuating force of nature, while difference in thought implies the fracture of the thinking subject, which is the 




sort of preliminary sketch of a solution—centred around the concepts of internal difference and 
hidden repetition. The real ontological scheme of Difference and Repetition utilizes novel 
concepts we are going to introduce in this chapter.  




iation 54. This clarifies Deleuze’s novel philosophy of difference. First, he is going to 
elaborate on “intensity” and a “variation in the virtual Idea” as two “figures” of the internal 
difference. Second, the persistence and transformation of objects of experience gets a unified 
description through Deleuze’s process of differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation—what the three syntheses of time 
described in the preceding chapter. In this way, differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation exhibits both repetitions, material 
and hidden, and a double description of internal difference. 
Before introducing and justifying my interpretation of Deleuze’s ontological scheme, I provide an 
overall picture for expository purposes. Deleuze writes that all objects have two sides: an actual 
side, and a virtual side (DR, 358). Deleuze calls the objects we can experience actual; they exist 
and can be given to subjects in experience. This actual “side” of objects is made up of extension 
and qualities we can perceive (DR 286, see also DR, 188–9). It is the actual object with its 
persisting characteristics which cover over the flux of change.  
A “virtual Idea” is the other “half” of the object (DR, 358). As a first approximation, the virtual 
Idea exists in a non-actual way (it exists but is not present to the object), and it contains all the 
possible changes of the system made up by the object (see Somers-Hall 2013, 151). Because it 
contains all the possible transformations of the system, it is another figure of internal difference 
(see 2.2. and 2.3. below for my interpretation). For example, a book can withstand certain 
movements: it can be opened, each page turned, and so on. These constitute a series of different 
organizations the book as a system can go through. Deleuze’s virtual Idea of the book would 
contain all the possible states the book can go through, meaning the movements and qualitative 
changes it can undergo. 
 
54 As I outlined in the introduction, this chapter is like a repetition of the first one—very much in Deleuze’s sense 
because what is repeated, is repeated as different from what it was. I note here that, for the purposes of this Master’s 





The actual side of the object contains what we normally take an object to be. With its virtual side, 
Deleuze wants to include in the object a virtual set of the possible states it can go through. Yet, 
what is the reason of the appearance of the object’s actual side? Why does the object go through a 
specific change contained in its virtual side? Deleuze accounts for these by a third ontological 
order: intensity. Preliminarily, intensity is a non-extensive and non-qualified order of intensive 
differences (for example, a difference in temperature). Intensive difference functions as the 
internal difference of systems. They engender change in processes. For example, when a kettle of 
water reaches its boiling point, an intensive difference instigates the vaporization of the liquid, or 
a change in the system of the boiling water. Intensity gives rise to spatiotemporal dynamisms, 
which in turn give rise to all extension and all quality, or the actual objects we encounter55.  
Interpretation of the nature and relation of these three orders (virtual, actual, intensity) has 
diverged in the secondary literature. Manuel DeLanda takes these registers to mean “the three 
ontological dimensions which constitute the Deleuzian world” (DeLanda 2013, 55). DeLanda 
emphasizes the ontological nature of these distinctions, how they are mind-independent traits we 
can attribute to reality. John Protevi has a similar view as it is for him, a “tripartite ontological 
scheme” (Protevi 2013, 4). However, Deleuze does not himself write about ontological 
dimensions. Deleuze himself uses order (“ordre”) to refer to these (DR, 286). I am going to use 
‘order’ to refer to these three interconnected terms and ontological scheme to describe Deleuze’s 
entire picture. Using the word ‘dimension’ risks the danger of separating these orders from each 
other and leads to connotations of dogmatic or pre-critical philosophy56.  
For Deleuze, it is important to avoid certain pitfalls, some of which he has attributed to preceding 
philosophers. This means that he needs to account for the constitution and progression of the two 





55 In the conclusion of Difference and repetition Deleuze portrays the whole ontological scheme of the book through 
the concept of “simulacrum” as the “system where the different relates to the different by difference itself.” (DR, 
355). Emphasising the concept of simulacrum achieves two things, First, it positions the ontological scheme of the 
book in terms of the overturning of Platonism Deleuze advocates: making the changing diversity primordial in 
relation to essence (e.g. DR, 95). Second, it emphasises representation as the object of critique in the book (DR 355–
6). To simplify matters, I leave out the concept of simulacrum from my close examination.  
56 The Kantian background of Difference and Repetition, although important for me, is not my focal point in this 
Master’s thesis. We can note the opening of the fifth chapter of Difference and Repetition, where Deleuze relates 




First, virtual Ideas cannot be like immutable platonic essences residing in another realm—
Deleuze needs to account for the constitution of virtual Ideas. The process of “differentiation”, 
with a ‘t’, refers to the way virtual Ideas are fully determined via a process, as each Idea arises 
from a problematic field. The virtual order of reality does not precede reality itself, but they do 
precede the actual objects found in it.  
Second, the progression of objects cannot be accounted only on actual terms; the virtual Ideas 
describe all the possible states and mutations a system can go through. Deleuze refers to 
actualisation of a virtual idea as “differenciation”, with a ‘c’. As differences arise in actual being, 
such as branching of a tree as it grows, the virtual Idea is actualised in being.  




progresses in an intensive field of individuation. Intensity gives rise to spatiotemporal dynamisms 
or individuals, which themselves give rise to actual extension and quality. According to Deleuze, 
the differentiation of virtual Ideas is “determined” by intensive differences in this field of 
individuation. Through the process of differenciation, the virtual Ideas are actualised, and 
according to Deleuze, intensity “expresses” virtual ideas in their actualisation. Together, these 
form what Deleuze calls “differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation”. At the end of the chapter I will examine John Roffe’s 
(2015) interpretation of differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation as a form of thinking. 
2.1. Intensity and the Actual 
The order of intensity fulfils two functions in Deleuze’s ontology. First, it works as the instigator 
of change. Intensive difference is another figure of internal difference and change and 
transformation originate from these intensive differences. (DR, 286; see also Clisby 2017, 241.) 
As changes and transformations underlie all persistent objects of experience, they have their 
ground in intensive differences. In other words, the actual emerges from intensity. Second, as the 
“being of the sensible,” all perceptible qualities and extensions are given to us through intensity 
(DR, 188–9; see Smith 1996, 39).  For example, two different colours are perceived as 
exemplifying different intensities of the colour—one flower can be more yellow than another. 
Here, I am going to refer to the first conception of intensity as intensive difference, situated in the 




sensible intensity “refers” to intensive differences of the ontological order, because they are 
engendered by them57 (DR, 294; DR 188–9)58. 
As an ontological realm, intensity is the “order of difference”. (DR, 286) and “difference in 
itself” (DR, 187; see Protevi 2013, 4). This order is itself not extensive nor qualified (DR, 310). 
In this chapter, we are not going to attempt an exhaustive interpretation of intensity as an 
ontological order59. First, we are going to start by distinguishing further intensive difference from 
sensible intensity. Second, we will see how sensible intensity refers to the ontological order of 
intensity. Third, we are going to turn to how change originates from intensive differences—how 
intensive differences function as internal differences. Fourth, we will see how actual objects arise 
from the intensive order. 
Differences in intensity or intensive differences come in many guises, e.g., as a difference in 
temperature or pressure (DR, 286). For instance, the temperature of 20 degrees Celsius is less 
intense than that of 30 degrees Celsius: there is an intensive difference between these two states. 
However, when we point to this intensive difference, we are not pointing to the 10 degrees 
Celsius we get when we subtract the numerical measurement of the less intense temperature from 
the more intense one—this is only a numerical representation of the intensive difference. 
According to Deleuze, we are pointing to a difference, which resides in the order of intensity 
“which pre-exists all quality as well as all extension” (Deleuze 2003b, 135)60.  
Intensive difference is distinct from differences we find in extensity and quantity. Quantities can 
be divided and added. A quantity, like ten pebbles, can be divided into two sets of five. An 
extensity, such as one litre of water, can be divided up. They are made up of the same “stuff” as 
the results of our additions or subtractions. We can even portray a difference in quantity, or 
 
57 Deleuze does not always specify which form of intensity he is referring to. His insistence on remaining equivocal 
in this distinction seems to arise from a decision to highlight the interrelatedness of these two senses. Intensity as an 
ontological order is imperceptible but it gives rise to sensible qualities, which are given via sensible intensities. 
Indeed, later in 4.1., I am going to discuss how Deleuze maintains that when we perceive sensible intensity, we are 
also, in a very specific oblique sense specified in 4.1., sensing the ontological order of intensity. 
58 “[…] renvoyer à un ordre impliqué de différences constituantes” (DR, 294). 
59 Deleuze writes that intensity is an “intensive space without other qualification [un espace intensif sans autre 
qualification]” (DR, 310). He also refers to intensity as a “depth is, as a heterogenous dimension (ultimate and 
original), the matrix of extension”, and as “space as intensive quantity: the pure spatium” (DR, 296; see Clisby 2017, 
249). However, I do not have the space here to give a detailed interpretation of these spatial characterisations of 
intensity as an ontological order. 




extensity, in the same terms—difference between 5 litres of water, and 2 litres, is a difference of 
3 litres. However, intensity cannot be divided up or added without changing its kind (DR, 306). 
We do not get the sensible intensity of 60 degrees Celsius by combining the sensible intensity of 
30 degrees Celsius with another 30 degrees61. The intensive state of 30 degrees differs in kind 
from 60 degrees, because it gives rise to other qualities. 30 degrees can be experienced as 
pleasant, whereas 60 degrees would be experienced as too hot. This difference in sensible 
intensity points towards the constituting intensive difference. 
The sensible intensity experienced in quality “refers to an implicated order of constituting 
differences,” that is, to intensity as an ontological order (DR, 294; DR, 188–9)62. This is, because 
all extensions and qualities result from intensity (DR, 327). Intensity is the “form of difference as 
the reason of the sensible” (DR, 287). For Deleuze, the ontological order of intensive differences 
cannot itself be perceived, because it has no extension, nor any quality63. However, quality and 
extension arise from intensive differences (as we will see in more detail below), and sensible 
intensity points towards the imperceptible world of intensive differences. 
Intensive difference, or internal difference, engenders change (DR, 286; see Bryant 2008, 238)64. 
Take an example from classical thermodynamics65. Imagine an airtight box with two 
compartments, which contain the same gas at two different temperatures. When a sliding wall is 
opened and the two gases come into interaction, they will mix and the resulting gas will reach a 
temperature in between the temperatures of the two separated gases. At the outset, there was an 
intensive difference between the two gases—this was what instigated the process of mixing. 
 
61 One might object that thermodynamics does explain things such as transitions from 45 degrees Celsius to 90 
degrees. However, with this objection, one misses the point. When we talk about the intensive difference between 50 
degrees Celsiuc and 90 degrees Celsius, we are talking about a difference which we sense through a sensible 
intensity, namely, the feeling of warmth. This sensible intensity points beyond, to the intensive difference, which 
engenders the quality. 
62 “[…] renvoyer à un ordre impliqué de différences constituantes” (DR, 294). Implication refers to how the intensive 
space is distributed, or implicated, in all actual objects. 
63 Dale Clisby writes that “Intensity lies beyond experience, as a transcendental principle” (Clisby 2017, 250). 
64 Levi Bryant refers to an intensive difference as an “ordinal difference” (Bryant 2008, 238). By this Bryant wants to 
emphasize intensive difference as marking a threshold at which something happens. If we take the example of the 
boiling point of water, we can note that the boiling point is not exhausted when we bring one contingent pot of water 
to boil. The boiling point can be reached elsewhere, and the point marks the threshold in which a process of change, 
namely vaporization of the water begins. 
65 Deleuze discusses classical thermodynamics extensively in the fifth chapter of Difference and Repetition and 
criticizes it for neglecting the intensive difference in favour of the state of equilibrium in the end state (DR, see 




Intensive difference, difference in intensity, works as the internal difference of systems and 
brings about changes (DR, 286).  
Deleuze offers a detailed description of how intensive difference instigates changes in systems. I 
will go over it briefly, because the details of the theory are tangential to my purposes in this 
Master’s thesis. First, there are two disparate intensive “series”, which enter into communication 
via a “dark precursor66” (Deleuze 2002b, 135–6). An example of Deleuze is a strike of lightning. 
To begin, we have two series of the states of electrical potential in two clouds. (DR, 156.) The 
difference in the clouds is repeated from one moment to the other. There is a difference in the 
intensity of the electric charge between them: an intensive difference between the series (ibid.). A 
dark precursor puts the two series into communication, and at the moment of their joining, a 
phenomena appears: a strike of lightning (ibid.). In this way, Deleuze describes how intensive 
differences instigate changes in systems, or progression in perceptible objects. 
However, how does intensity give rise to actual objects? According to Deleuze, every actual 
thing “refers” to a conditioning inequality, that is, to an intensive difference. The order of the 
actual is that of the phenomenon: extensity, quantity and quality, and these refer to the intensive 
order as what which conditions them. (DR 286; DR, 188–9.)67 The actual is in fact based on 
intensity. “Everything that happens or appears is the correlative of orders of difference: 
difference of level, of temperature, of pressure, or tension, of potential, difference of intensity” 
(DR, 286; Bowden 2017, 236.) The actual correlates with intensity. The diversity we perceive is 
engendered by the imperceptible world of intensive differences68. 
Again, Deleuze has a complex notion of how intensity correlates with the actual, and for my 
purposes, a cursory reading is satisfactory. According to him, intensity “expresses itself 
 
66 The dark precursor seems ad hoc here. However, for my purposes, we can think of it as a posited mechanism 
which has a function: enabling the communication between the two series. 
67 Deleuze refrains from using the concepts of cause and causality. This is a complex matter but one difficulty 
Deleuze seems to find in causal explanations is the danger of determinism. Instead, Deleuze chooses to talk about 
signals between different levels and systems, or as in this passage, about the sufficient reason for something (see 
Bryant 2008, 226–7).  
68 According to Deleuze, intensive difference is never cancelled out in intensity itself, but only in the actual, it is 
covered over by the qualities and extensities it gives rise to (DR, 294). To align this properly to an interpretation, we 
would have to examine more closely Deleuze’s claims about the ontological order of difference as an intensive 




immediately in the spatiotemporal dynamisms of the base” (DR, 316)69. Deleuze lists as 
examples “stirring of space, holes of time, pure syntheses of velocities, direction and rhythms.” 
These dynamisms give rise to all quality and extension (Deleuze 2002b, 134, 136). Deleuze calls 
“larval subjects” the “individuals”, which are directly under actual objects (Deleuze 2002b, 136). 
All these aspects make up the intensive field of individuation, which at bottom is engendered by 
of intensive difference (Deleuze 2002b, 135 and DR 316–7). So, directly from the order of 
intensity arise pure spatial dynamisms, which engender extension and qualities via individuals or 
larval subjects70. 
In this way, change and actual objects originate from the ontological order of intensive 
differences71. Extension and quality arise from this intensive field of individuation. As all quality 
is given through sensible intensity, it functions as the “being of the sensible”. 
2.2. Virtual Ideas 
If intensive difference is the instigator of change, is there something that orients or guides the 
engendered process? For this role, Deleuze introduces the notion of a virtual Idea72, or a virtual 
multiplicity. A virtual Idea is actualized in the process of differenciation, where it orients the 
changes the system of the actual object undergoes (DR, 237; we will look in more detail at the 
actualization of an Idea below in 2.3.). 
The virtual, as an ontological order, is distinct from the possible (DR, 247–8, 272–3; Deleuze 
2002b, 141; see Voss 2013, 126). First, when the possible is realized, it becomes ‘real’. To begin 
with, the possible does not have any reality in itself. This leads to the problematic view, where 
the production of the real becomes a “pure arisal [surgissement pure]” (DR, 272). The virtual, 
however, is fully real, in its own modality. For Deleuze, the objects we encounter in experience 
 
69 “[…] s’exprime immédiatement dans les dynamismes spatio-temporels de base” (DR, 316). 
70 This links Deleuze’s ontological scheme to the syntheses of time we discussed in 1.3 (see DR, 296). The 
spatiotemporal dynamisms make up the larval subjects, which should be interpreted as describing the same as the 
passive subjects produced by the two syntheses of time: habit and memory. 
71 Sean Bowden writes “[a]ctual entities are ‘metastable’ or intensive individuals. They in some sense are their 
constitutive intensive differences, and may be implicated in other, ongoing or future intensive processes. 
Nevertheless, insofar as intensity is in itself ‘uncancellable’ with regard to the actual extended and qualified forms 
that explicate it, intensity is something other than actual.” (Bowden 2017, 236). I agree that actual objects have their 
intensive reasons, and in this sense, have an intensive basis.  
72 Deleuze’s Ideas have their forebearers in Kant’s transcendental Ideas of reason, as Deleuze makes clear in the 
opening of the fourth chapter of Difference and Repetition (DR, 220–1, see also Voss 2013, 145–6 and Smith 2006). 




are actual. By actual, Deleuze means that something is real or existing and that they are present 
for being experienced. The virtual itself is something that does exist too, but it is not actual—is 
not directly experienced. In this way, the possible is not the counterpart of the virtual, but the 
actual is (DR, 247–8; Deleuze 2002 b, 141). Second, if we were to explain the progression of 
actual processes via the concept of possibility, this would have to be done by limitation (DR, 278; 
see Voss 2013, 127). If what actualises itself was possible, many more things were possible to 
begin with. Actualisation would have proceeded by eliminating the states that were not 
actualised. With the concept of the virtual, Deleuze conceptualises the progression of actual 
processes as a creation (DR, 278). 
The virtual Idea is not actual, but it orients the progression of processes (DR, 237). However, 
what is a virtual Idea and how does it relate to an actual object? First, a virtual Idea does not 
resemble the object whose actualisation it orients (Deleuze 2002b, 140). In The Method of 
Dramatisation, Deleuze separates succinctly two constituents of virtual Ideas, and they 
correspond with, without resembling, two aspects of an actualised object. On the one hand, are 
the differential elements, which are not actual, nor sensible, nor do they have a function—indeed, 
they are only determined by the reciprocal or differential relations they have with each other 
(Deleuze 2002b, 139; DR 237; see Bowden 2017, 228–9). In an actualised object, these elements 
“incarnate in kinds or separated qualities” (Deleuze 2002b, 140; see Bowden 2017, 228–9). The 
differential elements actualize in qualities and kinds found in actual objects, such as colour, 
hardness, and so on. On the other hand, are the singularities, or ideal events made up of the 
differential elements. They actualise themselves in extensities. (Deleuze 2002b, 139–40.) These 
singularities correspond to parts and organizations of objects—for instance, the leg of a chair 
corresponds to the singularity found in its Idea. In sum, the Idea is made up of differential 
elements and virtual singularities. These correspond, but do not resemble their actualizations in 
actual objects. 
The gene is one of Deleuze’s examples of virtual Ideas. Genes contain the hereditary information 
of an animal and they guide the way proteins are synthesised during the lifecycle of an 
organism—they orient the growth of an individual organism. Genes have their physical 
manifestation, but for Deleuze, the gene as a virtual Idea is not the same thing. The bits of 




separated from the whole they belong to. They gain their role from the relations they hold among 
each other: “genes express differential elements that characterise the global manner of an 
organism, and also play the role of remarkable points in a double process of reciprocal and 
complete determination” (DR, 240; see Clisby 2017, 255; Bryant 2008, 75)73. In the actual 
organism, differential elements correspond to the qualities and kinds that make up of the 
organism. The remarkable points refer to the singularities, which correspond to the organization 
of the organism.  
The gene as a virtual Idea is actualized in one member of the species but finds other 
actualisations in all the other members of the species. This is indeed a further distinctive feature 
of a virtual Idea. The differential relations between the constituents of the virtual Idea “should 
actualise itself in diverse spatiotemporal relations, at the same time when, its elements incarnate 
themselves actually in terms and varied forms. In this way, the Idea defines itself as a structure.” 
(DR, 237.)74 Idea, as a virtual structure, must be actualised in many actual objects. 
Next, I will discuss Deleuze’s reading of the differential calculus, since it highlights how the 
relations between the differential elements constitute a “figure” of internal difference. However, 
the differential calculus itself is nothing but a “technical model” for Deleuze and it showcases the 
process of differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation. Other kinds of models arise from different milieus. (DR, 285.) Here, I 
am following here Daniela Voss’s (2013) exposition of the differential calculus.  
The basic idea of the differential calculus is that we can investigate the rate of change of a given 












describes the quality of the curve, is it, for instance, rising or falling. (ibid.) 
 
73 “[…] les gènes expriment des éléments différentiels qui caractérisent aussi bien de manière globale un organisme, 
et qui jouent le rôle de points remarquables dans un double processus de détermination réciproque et complete” (DR, 
240). 
74 “[…] un rapport différentiel doit s’actualiser dans des relations spatio-temporelles diverses, en même temps que 





At this point, we can recognize that the differential relation, 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
, manifests Deleuze’s conception 
of a differential relation in a Virtual Idea. In the case of the curve, the  
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
 does not refer to a 
particular point—it is defined through a relation between points. The  
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
 describes the quality of 
the curve at that point, whether it is falling, for instance. In the same way, the differential element 
corresponds to a quality actualized in the actual object. 
Now, where the curve reaches a local maximum or a minimum, the 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
 gives us a gradient of zero, 
meaning the tangent drawn from that point is horizontal to the axis. Such a point is called a 
singularity or a singular point. (Voss 2013, 122–3.) These points mark instances where the 
behaviour of the curve changes remarkably: for example, the rising curve reaches its local 
maximum and begins to fall, after that singular point. This corresponds to the way a singularity in 
the virtual Idea correlates with extension. As the singular points of a curve denote changes in the 
curve’s behaviour, the singular points of the virtual Idea describe the way the actual object is 
extended in space. This means that the singular points guide the topological features actualized in 
actual objects. 
However, the differential calculus can highlight the way Deleuze sees virtual Ideas as directing 
the actualization of an actual object, that is the process of it persisting and transforming. Daniela 
Voss discusses how Karl Weierstrass introduced a method which can describe the behaviour of 
the curve in the neighbourhood of a single point on a finite continuous range of the curve by 
giving an infinite power series of derivates on the single point. According to Voss, Deleuze 
assumes that we can create the primitive function through Weierstrass’s method out of the 




of the singular points of the curve, we could produce the curve from them. For Deleuze, this is 
analogous to how the differential elements and singularities of the virtual Idea can generate each 
possible state of the system they describe.  




, provides an example of a difference, which is not representational. It does 




two terms—that is, as a differential difference. As the 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
 escapes representing a certain point, it is 
only the differential relation associated with the generation of that point. This means that the 
differential difference here, is another figure of internal difference. In general, the differential 
relations, which make up the singularities of the Idea, are “figures” of internal difference (DR, 
315, see Smith 2012, 83). 
Deleuze is clear that the role of differential calculus is illuminating, but mathematics is not 
fundamental: the calculus is “but a mathematical instrument” (DR, 235). Daniela Voss stresses 
that differential calculus is “a specific mathematical tool that entirely belongs to mathematics” 
(Voss 2013, 200). In fact, Deleuze states that “ [i]f the Idea is the differential of thinking, there is 
a corresponding differential calculus for each dialectic Idea that it incarnates” (DR, 235).75 The 
differential calculus does not provide an exhaustive model of Deleuze’s ontology, but it does 
provide an example of the functioning of a virtual Idea.76 
So, a virtual Idea is a pure multiplicity made up of differential relations (DR, 236; see Voss 2013, 
145). An Idea’s elements should not have any sensible form or conceptual signification, nor a 
designated function. They are virtual, so they are not actual. (DR, 237.) Only through the 
actualization of a virtual Idea can we perceive it. This means that we cannot sense the elements 
of the Idea, nor it as a whole, because it does not belong to the order of actual and is not thereby 
sensible.  
In the secondary literature, the interpretation of the virtual has led to some misconceptions (for a 
review, see, e.g., Clisby 2017, 251–255). For example, Peter Hallward mistakenly equates 
intensity and the virtual77. In Out of this World (2006), Hallward takes the virtual to be “more 
real” than the other ontological orders, because of its status as that which guides actualization.  
Hallward critiques Deleuze for rendering actual objects mere vehicles for virtual Ideas to act 
 
75  “Si l’Idée est la différentielle de la pensée, il y a un calcul différentiel correspondant à chaque Idée” (DR, 235). 
76 This sense is evident when Daniel W. Smith writes that “The calculus is a symbolism for the exploration of 
existence” (Smith 2012, 83). On a related note, Levy Bryant grants prominence to mathematical intuition, because he 
sees that mathematical intuition has the capacity to produce its objects from nothing. This is important for Bryant 
because the finitude of the subject is overcome, as the mathematical intuition extends its powers to infinity. Thus 
bridging the gap between finite and infinite for the subject. (Bryant 2008, 10.) Bryant seems to outline a role for 
mathematics more like that granted by Quentin Meillassoux in After Finitude (2006), and I do not see Deleuze 
proposing a methodological signpost like this. 




through. (Hallward 2006, 38). This approach fails in several respects. First, Deleuze clearly 
separates these two orders. Second, it misreads the nuanced way intensity, the virtual and actual 
influence one another (which I will discuss in the next subchapter). Third, Hallward’s criticism is 
misguided, as none of the three orders is more “real” than the others—they are three orders of 
existence. Dale Clisby summarizes succinctly the distinction between the virtual and the 
intensive as follows: “just as the virtual is said to be real without being actual, the intensive 
environmental present could similarly be described as real without being extensive” (Clisby 
2017, 256). The three ontological orders are to be separated, but they all are real, nonetheless78. 
In summary, the virtual Idea is a virtual multiplicity made up of differential elements, and 
singularities. These correspond, without resembling, to the qualities, kinds and extension of 
actual objects and organisms. As these differential elements only find themselves reciprocally 
determined, without representing anything actual, they contain a differential difference, another 
figure of Deleuze’s internal difference. Henry Somers-Hall sums this up excellently: “the 
differentials of the Idea together specify all of the possible states of affairs that a given system 




iation and Objectal Thinking 
We have discussed the two halves of Deleuze’s conception of objects: their actual and virtual 
sides. We understand that intensive difference functions as the instigator of change and it lies 
behind all extension and quality. However, we do not yet understand how the actual processes 
progress. As Deleuze writes, “we must form the complex notion of differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation to designate 
the integrity or the whole of the object” (DR 270).79  
As a first approximation of this process, differentiation with a ‘t’ refers to the way the virtual Idea 
is fully determined: each Idea arises from a problematic field. Differenciation, with a ‘c’, means 
 
78 Here, I align myself along with Clisby and other similar interpretation. Sean Bowden has argued that, as intensity 
is the reason of all actual, it actually has ontological primacy, and thus taking it on par with the virtual and the actual 
as ontological orders should be avoided (Bowden 2017, 236–7). However, even though I agree with the prevalent 
role if intensive differences, I think that both intensive differences and virtual Ideas play out the role of internal 
difference and repetition in Difference and Repetition. 
79 “[…] il faut former la notion complexe de différen
𝑡
𝑐





that a virtual Idea actualises itself, as differences arise in being. Actualization happens according 
to the differential elements and singularities making up the constitution of the virtual Idea. In 
Deleuze’s words, differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation refers to “at the same time the state of the differential relation in 
the Idea, or the virtual multiplicity, and the state of series, qualitative and extensive, in which 




concerns on the one hand how the virtual Idea, the virtual side of the object, is constituted 
(differentiation), and how actual thing, the actual side of the object, develops (differenciation)81. 
We can begin with, differentiation, with a ‘t’, because it is prior to differenciation. As Deleuze 
writes, “It is always in relation to a differentiated problem, to the conditions of differentiated 
problems, that a differenciation of species and parts operates, (DR, 267)82. Differentiation 
concerns the production of Ideas. Deleuze introduces differentiation by relating it to his ideas of 
problems and solutions: “The problem, as the object of the Idea, is found rather on the side of 
events, affectations and accidents, not alongside theorematic essence” (DR, 243; see Voss 2013, 
150)83. Each Idea has a problem as its object. These are something concrete, as opposed to 
“theorematics essences”. Deleuze needs to sidestep the error, where essences form a reality above 
actual existence. Differentiation connects Ideas to the actual, as they arise from concrete and 
actual circumstances (events).  
 
80 “[…] à la fois l’état des rapports différentiels dans l’Idée ou la multiplicité virtuelle, et l’état des séries, qualitative 
et extensive, où ils s’actualisent en se différenciant” (Deleuze 2013 (1968), 316). 
81 To be precise, Deleuze’s conception includes the intensive field of individuation (see 2.1.), which can be seen as 
the intensive “space” in which all other aspects processes progress (DR 310). At times Deleuze denotes the entire 
complexity of his conception as indi-differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation (e.g. Deleuze 2003b, 143). Another aspect Deleuze treats is the 
way intensity, via the spatiotemporal dynamisms it gives rise to, “dramatizes” the virtual Ideas, or determines their 




(e.g. in DR 317). Both aspects concern the intricate relationship between the three ontological registers, and for my 
purposes here, differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation is enough precision, because we need to understand virtual Ideas and their 
actualisation in what follows concerning Deleuze’s conception of transcendent thinking. However, intensity 
functions as another image of the internal difference we encountered in the first chapter, and for this reason, I have 
felt it needed to be presented in this chapter. Intensity will also have a role in transcendent thinking. 
82 “C’est toujours par rapport à un problème différentié, à des conditions de problèmes différentiées, qu’une 
différenciation d’espèces et de parties s’opère, comme correspondant aux cas de solution du problème. C’est toujours 
un champ problématique qui conditionne une différenciation à l’intérieur du milieu où il s’incarne.” (DR, 267.) 
83 “Le problème, en tant qu’objet de l’Idée, se trouve du côté des événements, des affections, des accidents plutôt que 




Deleuze discusses the virtual Idea of the eye as a response to a problem (DR, 172, note 1,). The 
eye has developed evolutionally in relation to a certain problem: how to navigate in the 
organisms’ environment. Fruitful interaction with the environment demanded the ability to, for 
instance, move about to search for nourishment. As light was present in the environment, it was 
beneficial to develop an organ which could utilize it for navigation. And from this problematic 
field, the virtual Idea of the eye arose, from where it became differentiated.  
Second, differenciation, with a ‘c’, is the actualization of a virtual Idea in the actual. The 
differential elements of the Idea actualize in the qualities and kinds of actual objects, whereas the 
singularities in the topological features of extension of the actual objects. (DR, 272; see Bowden 
2017, 226.) Differenciation can be highlighted by Deleuze’s example of the gene (DR, 276–8). 
As an organism grows, the genes as a virtual Idea orient the way it progresses. For instance, the 
colour of a human individual’s eyes depends on the genes passed on from their parents. As the 
embryo develops and the eyes are formed, the specific genes responsible for their colour are 
actualised in each cell of the iris. The differential elements of the Idea actualize themselves in the 
eye colour, whereas the shape of the eye is governed by the singularities of the Idea. However, 
Deleuze is clear that the differential relations do not resemble the actual relations they actualize 
through (Deleuze 2002b, 140). If the differential relations would resemble the actual extensities 
and qualities, they would be reducible to their actualisation.  




iation. As the instigator of change, intensive difference influences this process as well: 
“We talk about explication regarding intensity that “develops” itself, and which, precisely 
determines the movement of actualisation.” (DR, 316; see Bowden 2017, 228–9)84. As intensity 
develops itself, it determines the movement of differenciation. Because every actualisation of a 
virtual Idea presupposes an intensive difference as the origin of this change, intensity determines 
the actualisation of the Idea. In this way, “explication” of intensity “determines the movement of 
actualisation”85. 
 
84 “Nous parlons de différenciation par rapport à l’Idées qui s’actualise. Nous parlons d’explication par rapport à 
l’intensité qui se ‘développe’, et qui, précisément, détermine le mouvement d’actualisation.” (DR, 316.) 
85 There is an interpretative problem involved here. Deleuze insists that intensity determines actualisation of the 




The process of differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation reveals that the virtual Idea and intensive difference are in fact 
“two corresponding figures of difference” (DR, 315)86. Indeed, intensive difference as the 
catalysator of processes is a figure of internal difference, just as the virtual Idea, as a differential 
multiplicity (containing all the possible variations of the system), is a figure of the internal 
difference. In fact, the two presuppose each other: “[i]ntensities do not express or suppose 
anything else, but differential relations; the individuals do not suppose anything other than Ideas” 




plays out “[b]etween intensity and the Idea, a flow of exchanges is established” (DR, 315). The 
actual object progresses between these two figures of internal difference. 
Together, these figures make up Deleuze’s conception of internal difference and hidden repetition 




iation, under the form of change (time). The differential 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
 , as a differential relation, 
arises from the problematic field informed by the intensive field. The difference in intensity as an 
internal difference provokes a change in the system. However, the virtual Idea contains the 
possible variations of the system, constituting another figure of internal difference. The virtual 
Idea actualizes itself in the process of the progression of an actual object. In this manner, we 
observe how the actual object repeats itself on the surface level (material repetition), but the 




iation includes a double description of Deleuze’s conception of internal difference, 
enveloped in a hidden repetition covered over by the material repetition of the actual object. 
However, Deleuze talks about differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation as a kind of thinking. Deleuze writes that “[e]very 
body, every thing, thinks and is a thought [pensée], inasmuch as, reduced to its intensive reasons 
 
another? In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze writes that intensity “expresses” the virtual Idea (DR, 324). Sean 
Bowden (2017) has explored in detail the expressive relation between intensity and the virtual Idea, drawing from 
other works of Deleuze. However, for my purpose here, it is not needed to study in detail the expressive relation 
between intensity and virtual—we can be satisfied with the idea that the change inherent in the differenciation of an 
Idea is instigated by an intensive difference. 
86 “[…] deux figures correspondantes de la difference” (DR, 315). Deleuze also refers to an intensive difference as 




[raisons], it expresses87 an Idea whose actualisation it determines” (DR, 327)88. All actualised 
beings have their intensive “reasons”: they arise from the processes instigated by intensive 
differences on the level of intensity. In the process of differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation, the intensive differences 
determine the way a virtual Idea actualises itself in the actualised object. In this sense, the 
intensive ground of the actualised being thinks the virtual Idea, and the actualisation the 





In his article Objectal Human: On the Place of Psychic Systems in Difference and Repetition 
(2015), John Roffe explores differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation as thinking. He introduces a useful distinction 
between subjectal and objectal thought. Roffe defines subjectal as "the system composed by 
human thought, that is, the actual and achieved (that is individuated) noological capacities of 
homo sapiens – simply, human beings in the normal sense of the word” (Roffe 2015, 43–4). The 
objectal, “will concern the regime of objects and their primordial relationship with the pre-




corresponds to objectal thinking and is separated from objectal thinking (ibid.). 
Deleuze also connect the conception of objectal thinking to eternal return: “The thinker, without 
doubt, the thinker of eternal return, is the individual, the universal individual.” (DR, 327)89 This 




iation. Intensity gives rise to spatiotemporal dynamisms, from which individuals arise. 
As I above argued, differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation, is at bottom, Deleuze’s eternal return90. 
I began this chapter by asking how Deleuze accounts for persisting objects in our experience. As 
we have seen, Deleuze’s differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation describes objects as processes. However, the relation 
 
87 See footnote 85 above concerning Deleuze’s use of the verb ‘express’ in this context. 
88 “Tout corps, toute chose pense et est une pensée, pour autant que, réduite à ses raisons intensives, elle exprime une 
Idée dont elle détermine l’actualisation” (DR, 327). 
89 “Le penseur, sans doute le penseur de l’éternel retour, est l’individu, l’universel individu” (DR, 327). 
90 As further textual evidence, later in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze returns to the idea of eternal return as a 
kind of thinking: “To conceive eternal return as a selective thinking [pensée], and the repetition in eternal return as a 




between the processes discussed in this chapter and the persisting objects of experiences is indeed 
that between a representation and its conditions. To be precise, Deleuze writes that “the two 
correlative aspects of differenciation, kinds and parties, specification and organization. They 
constitute the conditions of representation of things in general.” (Deleuze 2002b, 134.)91 As 
differenciation produces actual objects, it renders possible their representation by thinkers. At 
bottom, “the dynamisms [i.e. the spatiotemporal dynamisms intensity gives rise to] and their 
concomitants [i.e. the individuals which precede organization of actual objects], work below all 
the forms and qualified extensions of representation” (DR, 137)92. The way these spatiotemporal 
dynamisms work is through the process of differenciation as the actualization of a virtual Idea. 




iation. However, in the next chapter we are going to turn to how these representations 
are thought—and what difficulties arise from it. 
3. Empirical Thinking 
Deleuze takes differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation to be a kind of thinking: the thinking of a virtual Idea as it is 
actualized. Alternatively, all progressions of systems, from the formation of minerals to growth 
of fungi colonies, satisfy this definition of thinking. This is not what we ordinarily refer to by the 
concept of thinking. Usually, we refer by it to many kinds of cognitive acts of the human thinker, 
such as recollection of a memory, deduction, discursive thinking, and so on. It would seem most 
of what human psychic systems labor through each day are these kinds of operations. For 
Deleuze, these acts operate on the level of representation. For example, when a past experience is 
recalled by the subject voluntarily, this recollection is representational in character. More 
precisely, the past occurrence has been retained as a representation by the subject and this 
representation can be called back, re-presented, to the subject by the recollection of memory. For 
Deleuze, these representational acts of cognition are grouped together under the “empirical 
 
91 “[…] deux aspects corrélatifs de la différenciation : espèce et parties, spécification et organisation. Ils constituent 
les conditions de la représentation des choses en général.” (Deleuze 2003b, 134.) 
92 “[…] les dynamismes, et leurs concomitants, travaillent sous toutes les formes et les étendues qualifiées de la 




exercise of the faculties” (faculties being distinct capabilities of the mind93) (e.g. DR, 186). I refer 
to them as “empirical thinking”94. 
In this chapter, I will first introduce Deleuze’s reading of Kant’s determining judgment95 (of the 
type, “this is a dog”). This provides the paradigm example of empirical thinking, and an 
important backdrop for understanding Deleuze’s notion of a transcendent thinking (see 4.1.). I 
stress that evaluating the exactness of Deleuze’s reading of Kant is beyond the scope of this 
Master’s thesis. Second, I will introduce Deleuze’s criticism of his predecessor’s conception of 
thinking. He takes preceding philosophers to have subscribed to a “dogmatic image of thought”, a 
representational conceptualization of thinking. I discuss the dogmatic image, especially as it is 
relevant to empirical thinking from the point of view of the determining judgment. Third, I will 
turn to Deleuze’s reading of Kant’s judgment of the sublime. Deleuze takes the third Critique to 
open a way beyond the empirical exercise of the faculties, towards the transcendent exercise of 
the faculties—the subject of the next chapter.  
3.1. Determining Judgment 
Judgements (“Urteil”; verb “urteilen”) are a special type of mental acts. Kant distinguishes 
between determining (“bestimmend”) and reflecting (“reflectirend”) judgements96. When a 
concept97 is given and we merely subsume the particular encountered in experience under it, we 
 
93 André Lalande notes that Kant uses faculty in a strict sense as a specific capability of the mind (e.g. 
understanding) distinct from mere receptivity of affectations from appearances. However, according to Lalande, a 
more general sense refers to the whole of receptivity as well. (Lalande 2016, 334.) I am following Deleuze in using 
the stricter sense of a specific capacity of the mind (or the psychic system, to use Deleuze’s term). 
94 To my knowledge, Deleuze does not use ‘empirical thinking’. Some secondary literature uses the term (e.g. 
Posteraro 215). This poses the possible objection that the empirical exercise of the faculties, would not constitute 
thinking at all for him. Answering this worry presupposes understanding the difference between transcendent and 
empirical thinking, so I will return to it in 4.3. 
95 I am building unto especially Deleuze’s reading of The Critique of Pure Reason, and more specifically, the A-
deduction’s three syntheses. This type of judgment is often referred to as cognitive judgment or judgment of 
experience. Deleuze develops his account in The Critical Philosophy of Kant. I retain Deleuze’s use of ‘determining 
judgment’, even though the distinction between determining judgment and reflecting judgment is introduced by Kant 
in the third Critique. This choice of terms emphasises Deleuze’s reading, where the judgment of taste (a type of 
reflecting judgment) “manifests [manifeste] and liberates a foundation which remained covered in” the determining 
judgment. Because Deleuze takes a judgment to be a result of several faculties working together, the condition of all 
types of judgments is the indeterminate relation of the faculties uncovered in the judgment of taste. (PCK, 87.)  
96 This distinction from the Critique of the Power of Judgement (CJ 5:179) parallels the distinction from The Critique 
of Pure Reason between reason’s “hypothetical use”, where reason finds the universal, and its “apodictic use”: when 
the universal is given (CPR A646/B 674). 
97 Kant writes about the object being subsumed under “the universal (the rule, the principle, the law)” (CPJ 5:179), 




make a determining judgement. (CPJ 5: 179, see also Voss 2013, 159). By making a determining 
judgment (such as “I see a dog”), the object appearing in experience is subsumed under an 
empirical concept (‘dog’)98. Here, the concept is empirical, since it does not necessarily belong to 
the object of experience—there is no logical necessity for it to be a dog instead of, say, a cat. The 
result of a judgment like this is knowledge as representational propositions about objects 
encountered in experience (PCK, 33).  
In Deleuze’s reading of Kant, the relation of the faculties, and the way they function together, is 
paramount. Overall, in a determining judgment, perceptual excitations are prepared by the faculty 
of imagination, so that the faculty of understanding may apply its concepts to the object of 
experience. In the rest of this subchapter, we are going to see Deleuze’s reading of how this 
happens. 
To begin, I will briefly introduce an overall sketch of the determining judgment. In the first 
edition Deduction, or A-deduction, of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant defines the determining 
judgment to be comprised of three distinct syntheses, or mental acts of combination, and a fourth 
operation, “schematisation”99. The first two, apprehension and reproduction, are performed by the 
faculty of imagination. These syntheses explain how our mind processes the affectations on 
sensibility into a singular mental representation: intuition. For Kant, the objects of experience are 
given through sensibility, our “capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way 
in which we are affected by objects” (CPR, A19/B33). The third step, schematisation, explains 
how the pure concepts of the understanding, the categories, can be applied to intuition. The 
imagination “schematizes” the representations according to the a priori concepts of the 
understanding (categories) and prepares the intuition for the last synthesis. In the final operation, 
the synthesis of recognition, the understanding subsumes the object of experience under an 
empirical concept (such as ‘dog’).  
Sensibility receives excitations and represents them as intuitions. This means, according to 
Deleuze, that “a diversity is represented, that is, it is posed as being enclosed [renfermée] in a 
 
98 In the Prolegomena, Kant distinguishes between a judgment of experience, distinct from a judgment of perception. 
The latter is not objectively valid because it does not include concepts of the understanding. (Kant 2010b, §18, 
4:298.)  
99 I follow here Deleuze’s interpretation (Deleuze 1963a, 24 and 28–29). It is similar to Paul Guyer’s interpretation 




representation.”100 (PCK, 24.) The diverse perceptual content of the affectations on the sensibility 
(colors, perceived extensive magnitudes etc.) are combined into a single representation. This is 
achieved by the imagination through two operations: apprehension and reproduction.  
The first operation is the synthesis of apprehension, which consists of posing the diversity in a 
spatiotemporal location (CPR, A99). This means that the mental representations for the 
perceptions are allocated a location inside the mind. An intuition is a direct mark in the mind: a 
re-presentation of the affectations on sensibility originating from the object of experience (CPR, 
A 99). Second operation is that of reproduction. By this, Kant means how representations “are 
finally associated with each other and thereby placed in a connection in accordance with which, 
even without the presence of the object, one of these representations brings about a transition of 
the mind to the other in accordance with a constant rule” (CPR, A100). Deleuze understands this 
as how we “reproduce the precedent parts, so we can arrive at the next ones101” when observing 
something (PCK, 24). Take the example of the curved surface of a red apple. When your eye 
follows the curve of the apple, the imagination reproduces in the mind the representations of the 
part your eyes have already observed. Without reproduction, you would not perceive the surface 
of the apple as continuing. Instead, you would only see a patchwork of unrelated gradients of red.  
However, in order to have a unified experience of an object, we need the faculty of understanding 
and its concepts. The understanding needs to think through the intuitions imagination has 
prepared for it: “intuitions […] are thought through by the understanding” (CPR, A19/B33, 
emphasis in original, see also A69/B94). The understanding thinks through the intuitions or 
conceptualizes them in two ways. On the one hand, the object of experience needs to conform to 
the categories, as the pure concepts of the understanding, which are devoid of any empirical 
content. On the other hand, the understanding applies an empirical concept to the intuitions.  
Kant provides twelve categories102 and states that “they apply to the object of intuition in general 
a priori" (CPR, A79/B105). This means that all objects of experience conform to these a priori 
 
100 “[…] une diversité est représentée, c’est-à-dire posée comme renfermée dans une representation” (PCK, 24). 
101 “par laquelle nous reproduisons les parties précédentes à mesure que nous arrivons aux suivantes” (PCK, 24). 
102 The table of categories comprises of unity, plurality, totality, reality, negation, limitation, of inference and 
subsistence, of causality and dependence and of community between agent and patient, possibility-impossibility, 




concepts103. For example, all extensive objects mush either conform to unity or plurality, that is, 
their number must either be one or they must be many. In this way, a category differs from an 
empirical concept, which relates directly to the object of experience (CPR, A320/B377).  
In the third operation, imagination conforms to the understanding’s categories via schematization. 
It schematises the intuition according to the a priori concepts of the understanding or categories. 
The empirical content of experience is organized according to the categories. This is a tricky 
subject, since Kant himself states that “schematism of our understanding is a hidden art [Kunst] 
in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from nature and lay 
unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty” (CPR, A141/B180–1).  
Deleuze interprets schematization as “a spatiotemporal determination corresponding itself to a 
category” (PCK, 28)104. This means that imagination implements the rules imposed by the 
categories through schematization105. So, if we encounter one apple in experience, it is 
schematized through several categories: unity, reality and limitation, because it is a singular 
whole with finite extension in space. The syntheses of the imagination represent the object as 
having a unity granted via the categories106. 
In the fourth operation, the understanding performs the synthesis of recognition. In recognition, 
the particular is subsumed under the empirical concept (CPR A 103–4). So, if the schematized 
intuition of the object of experience conforms to the empirical concept of ‘dog’, it is subsumed 
under this concept, and thus we have a determining judgment of a dog. (PCK, 28–29.) This 
means that the object of experience appears as a dog to the observer and is recognized as such 
(see also Posteraro 2015, 457)107.  
 
103 To be precise, Deleuze notes that the categories are “predicates of the transcendental object” (PCK, 26). The 
categories describe the most universal and simple characteristics all objects must display. Kant describes this object 
as “that which in all of our empirical concepts in general can provide relation to an object, i.e., objective reality” 
(CPR, A109). So, the transcendental object, as the carrier of the categories, is that which makes possible using 
empirical concepts. The transcendental object functions as the “objectivity as a form in general” (PCK, 25). 
104 “[…] une détermination spatio-temporelle correspondant elle-même à la catégorie” (PCK, 28). 
105 This is important, since schematization in Deleuze’s reading provides a link between concepts of the 
understanding and intuition. There is a gap between these two and, since intuition and concept differ in kind from 
one another, the vague nature of Kant’s schematization does little to bridge this gap (see Watkins 2017). 
106 Kant places importance on the notion of apperception and the unity consciousness (CPR, A103–110), but I 
overlook this aspect of the third synthesis here.  
107 Hannah Ginsborg discusses this type of reading as a “hybrid model” and ascribes it to Paul Guyer, among others. 




In sum, the determining judgment involves the co-operation of imagination and the 
understanding. Imagination represents perceptual excitations as intuitions. Further, it schematizes 
these intuitions according to the pure concepts of the understanding (categories). Then, the 
understanding recognizes the object of experience as something already familiar, as it subsumes 
it under an empirical concept. However, this happens very fast and in the everyday usage of the 
faculties, we do not note each synthesis separately. As a result of the judgment, the thinker now 
holds the propositional thought, for instance, that there is a dog in their field of vision. In this 
way, the determining judgment provides a paradigm example of empirical thinking.  
3.2. Dogmatic Image of Thought 
The determining judgment reveals fundamental insights into the dogmatic image of thought. Levi 
Bryant defines the image of thought as “an image or set of assumptions about what it means to 
think.” (Bryant, 2008). In the third chapter of Difference and Repetition, Deleuze treats the 
dogmatic image of thought at length, delineating eight postulates which make it up. These 
postulates are: principle of good nature of thought and the thinker, ideal of common sense, model 
of recognition, the negative of error, the privilege of designation, modality of solutions and the 
result of knowledge. 
The “model” of the dogmatic image of thought is that of recognition. In recognition, the faculties 
converge on an object, or more precisely, they handle their particular givens as belonging to the 
same object (DR, 174; see Bryan 2008, 83–4; Voss 2013, 35; Posteraro 2015, 457). What we 
encounter in an experience of an object is a collection of perceptual excitations (such as 
magnitudes of different colors, relations, and so on). In recognition, they are assumed to belong 
to a unified object. What’s more, the object encountered in experience is taken to resemble an 
object we already know, something we can recognize. Determining judgment provides a 
paradigm example of this.  
Off the eight postulates of the image of thought, the ideals of common sense and good sense are 
involved in recognition. By common sense, Deleuze refers to the way the faculties work together. 
 
thus the syntheses involved (Ginsborg 1998, 45–7). However, Deleuze places more importance on schematization 
and interprets it to involve the categories. For Deleuze, empirical concepts precede all determining judgments and he 





The faculties converge in order to recognize a single object (DR, 184, see Voss 2013, 33–4). In 
the case of determining judgment, we saw that imagination prepares intuitions for the application 
of the understanding’s concepts. Good sense is for Deleuze the distribution of the faculties (DR, 
216, see Voss 2013, 33–4). In a determining judgment, imagination is subjugated to the 
understanding: imagination schematizes according to the concepts of the understanding (DR, 
178, see also PCK, 28). The faculties of the mind are related to each other in a certain way, they 
have a distribution, which gives us the proper judgment type. In determining judgment, the 
imagination is subjugated to the understanding: imagination schematizes according to the 
concepts of the understanding (DR, 178, see also PCK, 35). 
Together common sense and good sense lead to a harmonious operation of the faculties. 
Determining judgment reveals a problem embedded in representation as a whole:  
“[…] the subject of representation still determines the object as really 
conforming to the concept, like an essence. This is why representation, in its 
entirety, is the element of knowledge that takes place in the recollection of the 
thought object and its recognition by a subject that thinks” (DR, 247)108 
Here, the first problem is that the empirical concept (for instance ‘dog’) is elevated to the status 
of essence. The empirical concept is removed from concrete reality, and it is posed as 
unchanging.  For Deleuze, there are no essences which arise above being: virtual Ideas arise from 
being itself. Second problem is that the determining judgment shows the extent to which 
representation concerns thinking. Representational knowledge means, for Deleuze, that the 
concept has to be given in advance—we need the concept of ‘dog’ to encounter one in 
experience. This suggests that the object encountered has to be already known. The object is 
recognized as such, and the concept is only recollected. There is no possibility of encountering 
something new—of thinking anything new (I will discuss how Deleuze’s transcendent thinking 
allows for creation in thinking in 5.1.). 
 
108 “[…] le sujet de la représentation détermine encore l’objet comme réellement conforme au concept, comme 
essence. C’est pourquoi la représentation dans son ensemble est l’élément du savoir qui s’effectue dans la 




The model of recognition is applied in the recognition of established values, as opposed to the 
establishment of new ones. Deleuze refers to Heidegger’s What is Called Thinking (1951–2) to 
re-iterate Heidegger’s point: we are not thinking yet (DR, 188). What is called “thinking” 
(empirical thinking) in the dogmatic image of thought amounts to no more than conventions and 
ingrained conceptions. In creating new values, “[w]hat is distinct in the new, that is, in difference, 
is to seek in thinking forces, which are not those of recognition, not today nor tomorrow, forces 
of a wholly other model, in a terra incognita never recognized or recognizable.” (DR, 177)109. 
Creating new values aligns itself with going beyond the model of recognition. Indeed, this applies 
to creation in thinking as well (as we will see in more depth in 5.1.). 
To create, to think something new, we have to free ourselves from the yoke of the dogmatic 
image of thought, because it “betrays most profoundly what it means to think, alienating the two 
powers of difference and repetition, and philosophical commencement and recommencement110” 
(DR, 217). Deleuze writes that “[t]he conditions of a true [véritable] critique and a true [véritable] 
creation are the same: destruction of the image of thought which presupposes itself, the genesis of 
an act of thought [l’acte de penser] in thinking [pensée] itself” (DR, 182).111 Breaking from the 
dogmatic image will be equal to transcendent thinking, but before that, we will see how 
Deleuze’s reading of Kant’s judgment of the sublime points towards a new kind of thinking: 
transcendent thinking (see chapter 4 below). 
3.3. Discord of the Faculties  
Deleuze is interested in an exercise of the faculties, which propels them beyond their empirical 
use, beyond the dogmatic image of thought. For Deleuze, Kant, in Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, uncovers a path to this in his judgment of the sublime112. The feeling of sublimity 
arises from a discordant relation between the faculties. For Deleuze, this means that Kant no 
longer presumes the relation of the faculties, as he did in the determining judgment, but shows 
 
109 “Ce qui s’établit dans le nouveau n’est précisément pas le nouveau. Car le propre du nouveau, c’est-à-dire la 
différence, est de solliciter dans la pensée des forces qui ne sont pas celles de la récognition, ni aujourd’hui ni 
demain, des puissances d’un tout autre modèle, dans une terra incognita jamais reconnue ni reconnaissable.” (DR, 
177.) 
110 “[…] trahit au plus profond ce que signifie penser, aliénant les deux puissances de la différence et de la répétition, 
du commencement et du recommencement philosophiques” (Deleuze 1968, 217). 
111 “Les conditions d’une véritable critique et d’une véritable création sont les mêmes : destruction de l’image d’une 
pensée qui se présuppose elle-même, genèse de l’acte de penser dans la pensée même” (DR, 182). 




how their relation is engendered. (PCK, 75.)113 In the next chapter, we are going to see how 
Deleuze ventures to envision his conception of transcendent thinking on the model of a 
discordant relation of the faculties. 
A judgment of the sublime is a type of reflective judgment114. Whereas in a determining 
judgment, a particular is encountered in experience and subsumed under a universal, in a 
reflective judgment, the universal has to be found and applied to the particular (CPJ, 5:179, see 
also Voss 2013, 159). This means that the concept is not readily available but has to be found 
through reflection. 
The sublime object115 is “absolutely great, great in every respect (beyond all comparison)” (CPJ 
§25; 5: 250). For example, a hiker might experience the towering mountain range as sublime. 
This means that for the proclaimer of the judgement, there isn’t anything that can be judged to be 
greater than the object of experience. However, Kant points out that all estimations of size are 
always made relative to the perceiver (CPJ §25; 5: 250). For someone standing on the foothill of 
a mountain, that mountain might seem incomprehensibly large, whereas the objective distances 
between the stars in the night sky, being vastly greater, do not appear as large. 
Properly speaking, sublimity is not a characteristic of the object: “The object serves for the 
presentation of a sublimity that can be found in the mind for what is properly sublime cannot be 
contained in any sensible form” (CPJ, 5: 245). Sublimity is something inherent to the mind of the 
observer, and the particular object of experience only acts as a “presentation” of it. The sublime 
 
113 This is closely related to the pure judgment of taste. For Kant, the subjective feeling of pleasure grounds the 
judgment of taste. In turn, this feeling comes from the faculties’s free play: “[t]he powers of cognition that are set 
into play by this representation [of the reflected form] are hereby in free play, since no determinate concept restricts 
them to a particular rule of cognition” (CPJ, 5:217). More precisely, the form of the reflected object is purposive in 
inducing a “free play” of the cognitive faculties in us, which then leads to the feeling of pleasure. (CPJ, 5:223.) 
Deleuze reads the free play as being an indeterminate relation of the faculties, presupposed by the relation they take 
up in other kinds of judgments—in this way the judgment of taste functions as the foundation of all judgments (PCK 
70–2; see Lord 2015, 87, 94; Voss 2013, 158–164). Deleuze proposes that the Analytic of the Sublime provides a 
genetic model which proves to be analogous to the genesis in the judgment of taste (PCK, 85; see Lord 2015, 96).  
114 Kant’s third Critique’s main concern is the pure judgment of beauty, for instance, “This rose is beautiful.” For 
Kant, this is not a determining judgment because, it is not a judgment in which the subject applies the concept 
‘beautiful’ to the rose. Indeed, what grounds the judgment of beauty, is the subject’s feeling of satisfaction: “That is 
beautiful which is cognized without a concept as the object of a necessary satisfaction” (CPJ, 5: 240, emphasis in 
original). Here, we are talking about a judgment of the sublime, not about a pure judgment of taste. 
115 Sublime objects come in two kinds: a mathematically sublime object (such as a mountain range) is something of 
an immense size in comparison to the subject of experience. Dynamically sublime objects (like the sea during a 





actually “[…] concerns only ideas of reason, which, though no presentation adequate to them is 
possible, are provoke and called to mind precisely by this inadequacy, which does allow of 
sensible presentation.” (CPJ, 5: 245, see also Voss 2013, 145–6.) In a sublime object, we are 
reminded of an idea of reason, which cannot have any correlate in sensible nature. An idea of 
reason is a type of concept going beyond any possible experience (CPR, A320/B376–377). For 
example, the idea of God, as a perfect being, is something incomprehensible to the human 
subject. When confronted with an object too large to be comprehended, the mind sees a 
presentation of an idea of reason, even though one “cannot be contained in any sensible form” 
(CPJ, 5: 245). 
However, what happens when the faculties try to process the sublime object? Kant writes that 
imagination needs to complete the two syntheses of apprehension and comprehension, to assess 
its size (CPJ, 5:251.). As we saw earlier in 3.1., by apprehension, the sense perceptions are 
represented in the mind as spatiotemporal intuitions. By comprehension, Kant means the way 
imagination retains apprehended intuitions and orders them into a sequence to measure the 
magnitude (CPJ 5: 252). So, with an example of a mountain, the imagination starts to convert the 
raw perceptual data into separate representations: a dance of shadows and light becomes a 
representation of a peak, for instance. However, as the imagination proceeds with taking up the 
“quantum in the imagination intuitively”. (CPJ, 5:251), comprehension reaches its “maximum” 
and as apprehension continues, “partial representations of the intuition of the senses that were 
apprehended first already begin to fade in the imagination” (CPJ 5: 252). The imagination has 
reached a maximum in its capacity of comprehension: it cannot provide a whole representation of 
the sublime object. 
Indeed, the mind is drawn to the ideas of reason precisely because of this inadequacy. Kant writes 
that when imagination begins to comprehend the object, it is “striving to advance to the infinite, 
while in our reason there lies a claim to absolute totality, as to a real idea, the very inadequacy of 
our faculty for estimating the magnitude of the things of the sensible world awakens the feeling 
of a supersensible faculty in us” (CPJ 5: 250). The supra-sensible faculty, reason, is awakened by 
the failure of imagination to comprehend the object. As Deleuze’s reading places importance on 





Deleuze interprets the failure of imagination to reveal a tension between the two faculties of 
imagination and reason: reason, through its idea, assigns imagination with an impossible task of 
the aesthetic comprehension of the sublime object.  This results in a “disaccord, an experienced 
contradiction between the will [exigence] of reason and the power [puissance] of the 
imagination.” (PCK, 74; see Lord 2015, 96.)116 For Deleuze, this reveals how the relation of the 
faculties in the judgement is engendered: reason is elevated to a commanding role over 
imagination through the projection of its idea in the sublime object. However, imagination cannot 
complete the task reason assigns it (aesthetic comprehension of the sublime object) and from this 
tension arises a “discordant relation” between the faculties. (PCK, 74.) Kant’s treatment of the 
sublime provides a genetic model of the relation of the faculties in this judgment (PCK, 76).117 
Deleuze writes that this discordant exercise of the faculties, uncovered in the judgment of the 
sublime, “defines the philosophy of future” (Deleuze 1993, 49). Indeed, it was a preamble to 
what Deleuze calls the transcendent exercise of the faculties.  
4. Transcendent Thinking 
In the judgment of the sublime, imagination and reason enter a discordant relation. This points to 
how the faculties function in their transcendent exercise. Each faculty meets an object which 
pushes it to its limit (as imagination was pushed in the judgment of the sublime). A series begins 
with an initial encounter by sensibility and then continues as a chain of disruptions of the 
empirical functioning of each faculty. In each case, the faculty meets something which is 
distinctive to itself, something the other faculties cannot grasp, and which propels it to its 
transcendent exercise. Because the limit-object of one faculty cannot be grasped as such by the 
other faculties, they cannot converge upon an identical object as they did in the case of a 
determining judgment, and their harmonious collaboration is derailed. The chain of encounters 
comes together in transcendent thinking. In this chapter, we are going to see in detail how this 
unravels.  
 
116 “[…] désaccord une contradiction vécue entre l’exigence de la raison et la puissance de l’imagination” (PCK, 74). 
117 According to Deleuze, we can provide an analogous genetic model for the judgment of taste, where reason 




It will help the reader to remember that Deleuze’s transcendent exercises of the faculties do not 
have a direct correlate in ordinary experience of a human subject. Instead, transcendent thinking 
is undergone subconsciously by the psychic system, and Deleuze describes the principles the 
faculties follow in such an act. Additionally, none of the separate transcendent exercises 
themselves correlate with conscious empirical experiences either. It is the nature of the 
transcendent exercise of the faculties to reach beyond their empirical use to a sub-representative 
and sub-conscious level. This means that the intermediate encounters (imagination, memory) 
cannot be described in detail—they only come together as part of transcendent thinking. Indeed, 
Deleuze does not strive to describe a first-person experience, but to provide an understanding of 
the principles which render production of the new feasible within a psychic system—something I 
return to in 5.1. 
However, at this point it is necessary to explain Deleuze’s use of concepts ‘transcendental’ and 
‘transcendent’. According to Deleuze, the image of thought “presupposes a certain distribution of 
the empirical and of the transcendental, and it is this distribution which needs to be judged, that 
is, this transcendental model involved in the image” (DR, 174).118 In the paradigmatic case of 
Kant119, knowledge has limits and the different faculties have their proper and improper use. The 
faculties can be used empirically or transcendentally. In empirical use, they stay within 
experience, whereas in transcendental use, their exercise “reaches out beyond the boundaries of 
experience.” (CPR A296/B353.) Empirical refers to what can be experienced, and each 
experience is defined as empirical. Transcendental, on the contrary, reaches beyond what can be 
experienced. This, however, is distinct from a transcendent use: “a principle that takes away these 
limits, which indeed bids us to overstep them, is called transcendent” (CPR A296/B353)120. In 
transcendent use, the faculties are not utilized correctly, because the limits of possible experience 
are blurred. For Kant, this will lead to misunderstandings and illusions (ibid.). 
 
118 “[...] cette image [de la pensée] présuppose une certaine répartition de l’empirique et du transcendantal ; et c’est 
cette répartition qu’il faut juger, c’est-à-dire ce modèle transcendantal impliqué dans l’image” (DR, 174). 
119 Deleuze does refer to his predecessors in a fairly monolithic manner. However, it is beyond the scope of this 
Master’s thesis to evaluate how Deleuze’s dogmatic image of thought should be seen to apply to many authors.  
120 Closely related to these questions are empirical illusions and transcendental illusions. In an empirical illusion, the 
faculty of judgment misleads (e.g. via imagination), and a mistaken judgment is made. Whereas a “transcendental 
illusion, which influences principles […] carries us away beyond the empirical use of the categories and holds out to 
us the semblance of extending the pure understanding” (CPR A295/B351–2). In other words, transcendental 




However, for Deleuze, transcendent use is not something we should strive to avoid, as 
“[t]ranscendent does not signify at all that the faculty aims at objects that are beyond the world, 
but on the contrary, it [i.e. the faculty] grasps that which concerns it exclusively in the world, and 
which births it into the world” (DR, 186)121. For Deleuze, transcendent exercise of the faculties 
reveals what is unique to each faculty. Additionally, it points towards their constitution, in the 
sense of revealing their internal differences (below we will see how the faculties emerge from the 
process of differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation). Not only explaining the emergence of subjectivity, but also 
explaining the creation of new in thinking (which empirical thinking is unable to do), and in 
doing so, render transcendent thinking truly transcendental122 and not traced from the empirical 
(DR 249; I will return and evaluate this in 5.1. and 5.2.). 
For Deleuze, the harmonious relation of the faculties is tied to the yoke of the postulate of 
common sense of the dogmatic image of thought. In order to overcome this image and reach 
beyond representation, we need to disrupt the functioning of thinking according to the image of 
thought. As the transcendent exercise of a faculty is beyond the empirical, it is also beyond 
representation (DR, 189). 
Below, I am going to argue for a novel interpretation of transcendental conception of thinking. 
First, we should distinguish between empirical and transcendent thinking in Difference and 
Repetition. For Deleuze, learning is an instance of transcendent exercise of the faculties, 
therefore, it is special case of transcendent thinking. Furthermore, I propose that to be even more 
precise, transcendent thinking is a special case of objectal thinking (John Roffe’s useful 
distinction introduced in 2.3.), that is, of the process of differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation unravelling through the 
faculties of a psychic system.  
 
121 “La forme transcendantale d’une faculté se confond avec son exercice disjoint, supérieur ou transcendant. 
Transcendant ne signifie pas du tout que la faculté s’adresse à des objets hors du monde, mais au contraire qu’elle 
saisit dans le monde ce qui la concerne exclusivement, et qui la fait naître au monde.” (DR, 186.) 
122 Deleuze writes that the transcendent exercise of a faculty reveals the faculty’s “transcendental form” (DR, 186). 




4.1. Transcendent Exercise of the Faculties 
Transcendent thinking123 begins with the initial encounter by sensibility (DR, 188)124. Deleuze 
follows loosely Kant’s use of “sensibility”. For Kant, the objects of experience are given through 
sensibility, our “capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations125 through the way in which we 
are affected by objects” (CPR, A19/B33). For example, when I see an apple, it is sensibility 
which is affected by the object. So, sensibility is the capacity of the psychic system to be affected 
by its surroundings. However, for Kant, experience is synthesized in the determining judgment. 
In Deleuze’s transcendent exercise, sensibility functions in a wholly another way as it encounters 
something it cannot treat in its empirical exercise. 
According to Deleuze, sensibility, in its transcendent exercise, encounters intensity (DR, 187–8; 
see Benit 2018, 33)126. However, the reader remembers that intensity as an ontological order, is 
 
123 In chapters 4–6 of Difference and Givenness (2008), Levi Bryant discusses at length the series of encounters, 
which make up the series leading to transcendent thinking (pp. 92–174). There are several key differences between 
my interpretation and Bryant’s interpretation, which render them incompatible. First, my conviction is that we can 
interpret transcendent thinking almost exclusively on the basis of Difference and Repetition, whereas Bryant draws 
from the breadth of Deleuze’s works. Second, I relate transcendent thinking to what Deleuze says about the faculties. 
This means that for me, the chain of encounters Deleuze introduces, results in a singular act of the psychic system 
(transcendent thinking)—Bryant’s interpretation borders on viewing each encounter as a singular (conscious) 
experience. I find symptomatic, the brevity with which Deleuze introduces the intermediary encounters: each 
encounter is but a part of the whole, and as such, we cannot correlate it with an experience. This also aligns itself 
with Deleuze’s open-ended view of the faculties (which I treat later), which Bryant seems not to acknowledge, by the 
way he seems to take Deleuze’s encounters as an exhaustive list. Third, Bryant does not seem to have interpreted the 
ontological scheme of Difference and Repetition correctly (insisting on viewing virtual Ideas as “differential 
essences” and describing Deleuze as a hyper-rationalist (ibid. ix, 13), and this too, leads the interpretation astray. 
These key differences already highlight the reasons behind the incommensurability of our interpretations. This means 
that, due to the space I am allocated in this Master’s thesis, I cannot exhaustively discuss all the differences in our 
interpretations. However, below I discuss some of our differences, as well as make use of several insightful readings 
Bryant has defended. 
124 It seems that the initial encounter in sensibility might have its origin in Deleuze’s reading of Kant. In Kant’s 
Critical Philosophy, Deleuze argues that the reflective judgment (or as I would specify, the pure judgment of taste, 
which is a specific type of reflective judgment) is foundational of all kinds of judgments. This is because it is 
grounded on the free play of the faculties, which Deleuze reads as being the indeterminate relation of the faculties 
and, thus, the condition of all kinds of judgments (PCK, 72). However, this lies beyond the scope of this Master’s 
thesis. 
125 Due to Deleuze’s critique of representation, it should be noted that Deleuze takes sensibility to also work in a 
nonrepresentational way (beyond only representing excitations as intuitions in Kant’s manner)—below we will see 
that in its transcendent exercise, sensibility works on a sub-representational level. 
126 Levi Bryant does not seem to acknowledge at all that sensibility encounters intensity in its transcendent exercise 
(Bryant 2008, chapter 4). Instead, Bryant refers mistakenly to the synthesis of habit as producing quality (ibid. 93) to 
make sense of this encounter with that “which cannot be but sensed”. However, Deleuze is clear about this: “It is not 
qualitative opposition in sensibility, but an element which is itself difference, and which creates at the same time 
quality in the sensible and the transcendent exercise in the sensibility: this element is intensity” (DR, 187). This is a 
good example of the way Bryant’s interpretation relies on a confused interpretation of Deleuze’s ontological scheme 




itself imperceptible. It is the order of intensive difference, which remains nonqualified and 
nonextended. (see 2.1.) The empirical exercise of the faculties is confronted with actual things 
that intensity gives rise, but intensity remains itself “covered” by the qualities it engenders. 
Therefore, intensity remains insensible to empirical sensibility (DR, 187, 294; see Benit 32–3.)  
However, the second meaning of intensity, sensible intensity (e.g. the intensity of the colour of a 
given object) is directly perceptible. Indeed, Deleuze is equivocating between the two senses to 
highlight their connection. 
When sensibility ascends to its transcendental exercise, it confronts intensity, which “is at the 
same time the imperceptible, and that which cannot be but sensed” (DR, 297; see Lord 2015, 
98)127. The “imperceptible” intensity refers to the unqualified and nonextended order of pure 
intensive differences. This intensive order cannot be met directly by sensibility. However, 
qualities are given through sensible intensity. As all qualities are given through sensible intensity, 
this kind of intensity is met necessarily by sensibility—we cannot conceive of a quality which is 
not given through sensible intensity. 
According to Deleuze, quality works as a “sign” as it “refers to an implicated order of 
constituting differences” (DR, 294; DR 188–9; see Smith 1996, 39)128. Quality refers to the 
intensive order of difference. Intensive differences are “implicated” in the nonextended and 
unqualified order of intensity: this order works as the individuating field from which all extension 
and all quality arises (see 2.1.). However, as all perceptible qualities and extensions arise from 
this intensive order, and it is on this ground that they work as signs which refer to it. In this way, 
the perceptible sensible intensity works as a sign for the imperceptible order of intensive 
differences. In this way, intensity in these two meanings is “that which cannot be but sensed 
[senti] from the point of view of transcendent sensibility which apprehends it immediately in the 
encounter.” (DR, 187–8.)129  
However, not sensibility, nor the psychic system as a whole, interpret sensible intensity as a sign 
consciously. Deleuze is clear that transcendent thinking and its constituent transcendent exercises 
 
127 “L’intensité est à la fois l’insensible et ce qui ne peut être que senti” (DR, 298). 
128 “[…] renvoyer à un ordre impliqué de différences constituantes” (DR, 294). 
129 “[…] ce qui ne peut être [187/188] que senti du point de vue de la sensibilité transcendante qui l’appréhende 




of the faculties are unconscious (e.g. DR, 214). In its transcendent exercise, sensibility opens up 
to intensity, which is another figure of internal difference (see 1.1., 2.1. and 2.3.). The chain of 
encounters will continue, and in each case, “a free figure of difference awakens the faculty”130 
(DR, 189), and “[e]very faculty discovers […] its radical difference and its eternal repetition, its 
differential and repetitive element” (DR, 186)131. In this sense, the transcendent exercise of each 
faculty means an opening up to the effects of internal difference.  
The series continues as each faculty discovers what is singular to only them. This happens 
through an encounter with the “limit-object or the transcendent of every faculty” (DR, 190, see 
also Bryant 2008, 100, Voss 2013, 142–3)132. Deleuze refers to the limit-object of each faculty by 
the latin gerundive derived from the faculty’s name, sentiendum, imaginandum, memorandum 
and cogitandum (DR, 182–4). The gerundive is translated as a need to do or achieve 
something133, sentiendum as the need to sense something, for instance. This emphasises the 
nonvoluntary character of the encounters: psychic systems do not choose to engage in them but 
are forced to do so. 
As the limit-object of each faculty is specific to only it, the other faculties cannot treat the same 
object (as they did in their empirical exercise, as evidenced in the case of determining judgment 
in 3.1.). For instance, the limit-object of sensibility is sensible intensity, which no other faculty 
can encounter. As the faculties ascend to their transcendent use, “common sense is no longer 
there to limit the specific contribution of sensibility to the conditions of a joint work; it enters 
into a discordant play” (DR, 182).134 So, sensibility encounters the intensive which propels out to 
its transcendent use. This encounter propels the faculties outside of a common sense orchestrating 
the exercise of the faculties in a determining judgment (see 3.1.) However, this relation of the 
faculties, “discordant relation”, was already sketched out in Kant’s judgment of the sublime (see 
3.3. above, as well as Lord 2015, 99). Because representation presupposes the model of 
 
130 “[…] c’est chaque fois une libre figure de la différence qui éveillé la faculté” (DR, 189). 
131 “Chaque faculté découvre alors la passion qui lui est propre, c’est-à-dire sa différence radicale et son éternelle 
répétition, son élément différentiel et répétiteur” (DR, 186). 
132 “[…] vont de la sensibilité à la pensée, et de la pensée à la sensibilité, capables d’engendrer dans chaque cas, 
suivant un ordre qui leur appartient, l’objet-limite ou transcendant de chaque faculté” (DR, 190). 
133 Probably the most famous example is Horace’s Ode 37 (also known as the Cleopatra-ode since it describes the 
atmosphere as news of Cleopatra’s demise reach the narrator of the poem), which begins with the line “Nunc est 
bibendum”, which translates literally “Now is time for drinking”, ‘bibendum’ being the gerundive. 
134  “Le sens commun n’est plus là pour limiter l’apport spécifique de la sensibilité aux conditions d’un travail 




recognition and the convergence of the faculties on an identical object, the fact that each faculty 
meets something only they can comprehend means that the limit-object is necessarily sub-
representational.  
Deleuze dubs the communication of the violence between the faculties “para-sense”135 (DR, 190, 
250), opposed to common sense. In a para-sense, the faculties do not work together. They only 
communicate the violence of their own encounter with what is most proper to them. As Daniela 
Voss writes, “Ideas set their corresponding faculty into motion and carry it to its extreme limit, 
but at the same time this violence is communicated from one faculty to another” (Voss 2013, 
143; see Lord 2017, 99).  
The initial encounter with intensity cannot be repeated by any of the other faculties, so something 
else needs to communicate the violence to the next faculty. According to Deleuze, virtual Ideas 
enact the communication between the faculties136, as they “go from sensibility to thinking, and 
from thinking to sensibility, being capable of engendering in each case, following an order which 
belongs to them, the limit-object or the transcendent of every faculty” (DR, 190)137. The virtual 
Idea traversing the faculties is not the limit-object, but “is capable of engendering” (ibid) it. In 
2.3., we saw that intensity determines the actualization of an Idea. Here, it makes sense that the 
initial encounter is between sensibility and intensity, as intensity determines the actualization of 
the Idea, which begins to traverse the faculties according to the para-sense. 
We must read the series of encounters as constituting a process of differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation. The initial 
encounter with intensity determines the actualisation of a virtual Idea. and this means that a 
process of actualisation begins to unravel throughout the faculties of the psychic system.  Levi 
Bryant is right in taking faculties to be “tendencies characterizing being. They are the 
differentials or joints of being itself.” (Bryant 2008, 97–8). In this way, transcendent exercise of a 
 
135 The word choice of para-sense refers first to the paradox, opposed to common sense (DR, 190, 250). Second, it 
refers to the classical Greek ‘παρά’, a preposition used commonly to denote movement from somewhere. The second 
meaning emphasises the communication of the encounter., 
136 Indeed, the Ideas provide the virtual unconsciousness, which “defines itself by the extra-propositional and non-
actual characteristic of Ideas in the para-sense” (DR, 251)136 . A virtual Idea is beyond representation, as an object, 
an empirical exercise of the faculties cannot treat it.  
137 “[…] vont de la sensibilité à la pensée, et de la pensée à la sensibilité, capables d’engendrer dans chaque cas, 




faculty means that it is differenciated according to the Idea which is traversing the faculties (I 
will return to this below in 4.2.) 
Deleuze describes very briefly how the series of encounters continues through the intermediate 
encounters of imagination and memory. The reason for his brevity is that there are, by definition, 
no conscious experiences which correlates with any of the encounters that elevate the faculties to 
their transcendent exercises. His aim is to describe the principles which guide this sub-
representational functioning of the faculties. Each encounter gains its meaning as a link in the 
chain of encounters leading up to and coming together in transcendent thinking138. This is 
analogous to the way we saw Deleuze read Kant’s determining judgment as resulting from 
imagination functioning according to the understanding—indeed, there is no determining 
judgement without imagination, nor is there one without the understanding.  
Beth Lord writes that “[p]ara-sense indicates a commonality through divergence, a difference that 
draws together” (Lord 2015, 100), and that difference is indeed the internal difference of each 
faculty139. The limit-object drives the faculty to discover “the passion that is most proper to it, 
that is, its radical difference and its eternal repetition, its differential and repetitive element, like 
the instant engendering of its act and the eternal overturning of its object, its manner of being 
born as already repeating” (DR, 186)140. So, when a faculty confronts what is most singular to it, 
the object only it can process, it discovers its internal difference, and how it is engendered by this 
difference. The faculty discovers how it is “born as already repeating.” Below, I argue that we 
must read these encounters as instances of differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation, which explains that being born refers 
to being transformed by this process—the faculties undergo a change, they are engendered (or 
given birth) as different from what they were before the encounter. 
 
138 Levy Bryant (2008) interprets each link of this chain as a (quasi-)independent encounter bordering on an 
experience. 
139 Levy Bryant writes: “The encounter [with the limit-object of a faculty] is the sign of a limit, which in turn 
indicates a domain of difference belonging to that faculty alone” (Bryant 2008, 100), and I would precise, that it is 
indeed its internal difference—this will become more evident if we think of the whole process of transcendent 




140 “Chaque faculté découvre alors la passion qui lui est propre, c’est-à-dire sa différence radicale et son éternelle 
répétition, son élément différentiel et répétiteur, comme l’engendrement instantané de son acte et l’éternel 




Next in the series, sensibility communicates the violence of the encounter with its limit object to 
imagination. This object is the imaginandum, that which must be imagined. Deleuze writes that 
“it’s the phantasm, the disparity in the phantasm that constitutes the φανταστέον, that which 
cannot be but imagined, empirical unimaginable” (DR,188)141. As Deleuze talks about the 
phantasm, it does not refer Kantian imagination which reproduces perceptual content in the form 
of an intuition in the mind (see 3.1. above), nor does it suggest imagination’s workings in a 
judgment of the sublime. Again, Deleuze is not referring to something we can attain in an 
empirical exercise of imagination. Indeed, on the basis of the text, we cannot describe or define 
the phantasm any more closely142. Instead, it is “a free form of difference that awakes the faculty 
and awakes it as the different of this difference” (DR, 189)143. For these reasons, it lies in the 
unconscious exercise of the faculty on a non-representative level. However, what is important is 
that it breaks imagination from its empirical use and elevates it to its transcendent exercise. 
Next up is the memorandum of memory. For Deleuze, the limit object is “the dissimilar in the 
pure form of time which constitutes the immemorial of a transcendent memory” (DR, 188)144. 
The “pure form of time” refers to time as the “form of everything that changes and moves, but it 
is an unchanging form and does not change.” (Deleuze 1993, 42, see 1.2. above for more145)146. 
The only constant for Deleuze is change, and, for memory, its internal difference must be the 
“dissimilar” which always returns as different—and as such, cannot be recalled. As in Deleuze’s 
reading of eternal return (see 1.2. and 1.3.), that which returns is only the dissimilar, or in other 
words, what repeats itself, is difference. Time as the form of change, underlies the workings of 
memory, and in its transcendental exercise, memory is confronted with its internal difference, of 
the “dissimilar in the pure form of time” (ibid.). 
 
141 “[…] c’est le fantasme, la disparité dans le fantasme qui constitue le φανταστέον, ce qui ne peut être qu’imaginé, 
l’inimaginable empirique” (DR, 188). 
142 Levi Bryant does not discuss at all the transcendent exercise of imagination—symptomatic of the way his 
interpretation misunderstands the role of the individual transcendent exercises. 
143 “[…] c’est chaque fois une libre figure de la différence qui éveille la faculté, et l’éveille comme le différent de 
cette difference” (DR, 189). 
144 “[…] le dissemblable dans la forme pure du temps qui constitue l’immémorial d’une mémoire transcendante” 
(DR, 188). 
145 Levy Bryant interprets this, instead, as relating to the pure past (Bryant 2008, chapter 5). The pure past concerns 
the second passive synthesis of time (memory). Pure past is the ontological conception of the past, which grounds the 
present produced by the first synthesis of time. (see 1.2. above.) 





The series of encounters147 comes together in thinking meeting its cogitandum. As memory 
transmits the violence of its encounter, thinking meets its cogitandum: “not the intelligible, 
because it is but the mode under which we think what could be other than thought” (DR, 183). In 
other words, intelligibility is the mode, which renders objects thinkable by the empirical exercise 
of the faculties. That is, the conditions of a determining judgment: the object must be shared by 
the faculties working under common sense. So, transcendent thinking’s limit object is not the 
intelligible, “but the being of the intelligible as the last power of thinking, unthinkable as well” 
(DR, 183–4)148. The being of the intelligible refers to Deleuze’s conception of the two figures of 
internal difference, as the condition of any representation of objects (see 1.2. and 2.3.). Indeed, 
the unthinkable constitutes the whole of the series of encounters in the transcendent exercise of 
the faculties. None of them are thinkable from the perspective of the empirical use of the 
faculties. The virtual Idea which has engendered the cogitandum of thinking by raising the other 
faculties to their transcendent exercise. All of this points to the internal difference of the thinker 
and elevates thinking to its “last power” (DR, 184). This points to the internal difference of the 
thinker we was in chapter one. 
Transcendent thinking is engendered by each of the faculties of the thinker being exposed to their 
internal difference and discovering what is most singular about them. Each of these transcendent 
exercises of the faculties gains their meaning from their relations with one another—Deleuze 
does not describe more than the principle by which they are propelled into their transcendent 
exercise, i.e., meeting their internal difference. Therefore, the series of encounters results in one 
unconscious act of the psychic system: transcendent thinking. 




At this point, we can make sense of transcendent thinking in relation to Deleuze’s conception of 
internal difference (as we saw in chapter 1). The thinker of transcendent thinking is the fractured 
I (see 1.1.). The fractured I “is forced to think that which cannot be but thought, not the Same, but 
 
147 Deleuze’s conception of the faculties is open-ended, so we can suppose that there can be many more intermediate 
encounters (DR, 186–7, 330–1, see also Voss 2013, 142.). 
148 “[…] non pas l’intelligible, car celui-ci n’est encore que le mode sous lequel on pense ce qui peut être autre chose 




this transcendent ‘aleatory point’, always Other by nature” (DR, 188; see Smith 1996, 31) 149. As 
the fractured I tries to attain itself as a thinking being, it can only reach itself as given in time (the 
“transcendent ‘aleatory150 point’”), and thus it becomes other than what it was initially (see 1.1.). 
The thinker of transcendent thinking is the fractured I, impaled by the straight line of time, as the 
form of change. In other words, transcendent thinking exposes the thinker to its internal 
difference, and forces it to repeat itself as different from what it was. As such, transcendent 
thinking engages the thinker in eternal return151 (see 1.3. and 2.3.). 
Here we can also connect transcendent thinking to the passive subjectivity, which cannot think its 
own activity (see 1.1., and 1.3.). Thinking is “an affectation of a passive self which feels [sent] 
that its own thinking, its own intelligence, by which, it says I, exercises in himself and on 
himself, not by himself.” (DR, 117)152 Transcendent thinking as the violence running through the 
faculties is an Other to the passive subject. The unconscious activity of transcendent thinking is 
something the passive subject cannot control, nor even understand through empirical thinking. 
Transcendent thinking disrupts the thinker, breaks the common sense of the faculties empirical 
use, and exposes the thinker’s core of changing being (DR, 188). “[T]hinking is forced to think 
also its central collapse, its fracture, its own natural “impotence”, which is confounded with the 
greatest power, that is with its cogitanda” (DR, 192)153. The empirical thinking of the passive 
subject confronts its own incapability to cope with transcendent thinking without collapsing. 
What characterizes transcendent thinking is its “universal ungrounding [effondement]” (DR, 
251). Transcendent thinking is the model of thinking that satisfies Deleuze’s new philosophy of 
internal difference and hidden repetition. 
 
149  “[…] contraint de penser ce qui ne peut être que pensé, non pas le Même, mais ce ‘point alétoire’ transcendant, 
toujours Autre par nature” (DR, 188). 
150 Aleatory refers to the throw of the dice. In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze discusses eternal return via the 
metaphor of a throw of the dice (Deleuze 2010, 29–31). Here, the aleatory point refers to the hidden repetition forced 
by the internal difference in eternal return (see 1.3.). 
151 Daniela Voss does not distinguish between empirical thinking and transcendent thinking, as I do. However, Voss 
also links transcendent thinking to eternal return: “[t]hrough the repetition of the eternal return the identity of the 
thinking subject is dissolved and turned into a series of little selves or simulacra. Thought occurs only at this extreme 
point of the fractured I. The transcendental and genetic conditions of thought have thus to be considered in relation to 
Deleuze's complex theory of time.” (Voss 2013, 210.) 
152 “[…] une affection d’un moi passif qui sent que sa propre pensée, sa propre intelligence, ce par quoi il dit JE, 
s’exerce en lui et sur lui, non pas par lui” (DR, 117). 
153  “[…] la pensée est forcée de penser, c’est aussi bien son effondrement central, sa fêlure, son propre ‘impouvoir’ 




However, Deleuze clearly connects transcendent thinking to differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation. At the very end of 
the third chapter of Difference and Repetition Deleuze, after having discussed transcendent 
thinking, he poses the question: “What is thinking such as this, and what is its process in the 













Faculties are components of the psychic system, and as such, have their actual counterparts. 
There is no room in Deleuze’s ontology for faculties as supernatural spiritual capabilities. Indeed, 
Levi Bryant is right in taking faculties to be “tendencies characterizing being” (Bryant 2008, 97–
8). Each faculty has a virtual side, and an actual side, and their persistence in a psychic system is 
founded upon an actualization of a virtual Idea (see 2.3).   




iation. A process of change begins, as the first encounter with intensity is initiated. 
From there, intensity determines the actualisation of a virtual idea (as in 2.3). As the actualization 
proceeds, the faculty succumbs to a transformation, as its actualized being changes, or as it 
differenciates. According to Deleuze, Ideas function as differentials of thinking, or the 
unconsciousness of a pure thinking (DR, 251)—in the way they traverse the faculties of the 
thinker in para-sense. This chain of encounters “runs through the bits of a dissolved self as the 
sides of a fractures I” (DR, 190)156. In this way, transcendent thinking, is at bottom objectal 
thinking, which unravels through the faculties of the psychic system.  
 
154  “Mais qu’est-ce qu’une telle pensée, et son processus dans le monde ?” (DR, 217). 
155 In the sixth chapter of Difference and Givenness (2008), Levi Bryant talks about the transcendent exercise of 




iation. This results in a reading, which reads Ideas as mainly concerning transcendent thinking, whereas, in 
my view, they concern the whole series of transcendent exercises. It seems that this mistake originates from Bryant’s 
peculiar reading of virtual Ideas as differential essences.  





As discussed in 2.3., John Roffe (2015) distinguishes between objectal and subjectal thought. 
Roffe defines objectal as “the regime of objects and their primordial relationship with the pre-




objectal thinking. Deleuze writes, “Every body, every thing thinks and is a thought [pensée], in as 
much as, reduced to its intensive reasons [raisons], it expresses an Idea whose actualisation it 
determines” (DR, 327)157.  As a being is differenciated, it “thinks” the virtual Idea it actualises. 
Roffe contrasts this objectal thinking to subjectal thinking. By subjectal, Roffe refers to "the 
system composed by human thought, that is, the actual and achieved (that is individuated) 
noological capacities of homo sapiens – simply, human beings in the normal sense of the word” 
(Roffe 2015, 43–4).  
However, we have to make a further clarification here. One level of Roffe’s subjectal thinking 
coincides with my reading of empirical thinking. What Roffe’s account does not specify, is the 
role of transcendent thinking. For him, “subjectal thought is representational in nature, and turns 
around the figures of the ‘I’ and the ‘Self’” (Roffe 2015, 52). Here, we have seen that 
transcendent thinking occurs at the very limit of the faculties of the thinker. To be exact, 
transcendent thinking cannot be experienced by a subject—it can only be suffered unconsciously 
by one. Transcendent thinking is at bottom objective thinking running through the faculties of a 
thinker, whether human or non-human. In this sense, it is very much a form of subjective 
thinking—what the case of learning showcases clearly. 
4.3. Learning as an Instance of Transcendent Thinking 
Empirical thinking operates according to the model of recognition and it produces propositional 
knowledge. Deleuze opposes learning to it. Learning differs in kind from knowledge and it 
concerns something “extra-propositional and sub-representative” (DR, 248). An act of learning 
does not reduce to its outcome, even if the result would be a representational proposition. As 
Deleuze writes, we cannot see from advance how someone is going to learn (DR, 215). Even 
though we can provide some sort of a roadmap for a learner, we cannot portray in advance how 
they are going to learn—everyone needs to wrestle through their own learning processes. For 
 
157 “Tout corps, toute chose pense et est une pensée, pour autant que, réduite à ses raisons intensives, elle exprime 




instance, we do not learn to play an instrument simply by reading a guidebook or listening to the 
teachings of someone (no matter how useful these will be for the process). Taking in all the 
possible propositional knowledge on the subject does not exhaust the need to try and fail oneself. 
In this way, learning is an experimentation on the part of the learner.  
Deleuze writes that “[l]earning is nothing but the intermediary between non-knowledge and 
knowledge, the living passage from one to the other” (DR, 215)158. Learning happens between the 
initial stage where the learner does not possess the resulting knowledge, and where they have 
attained it. Deleuze discusses learning to swim as an example159. He writes that “[l]earning to 
swim […] signifies composing the singular points of one’s own body […] with those of another 
figure, with another element that dismembers us, but which makes us penetrate into a world of 
problems, until then, unknown and unprecedented” (DR, 248)160. Learning means that the subject 
realigns itself according to new coordinates of the problematic field they find themselves in. In 
fact, as actualisation of actual objects is oriented by Ideas, learning means engaging with the 
Ideas as well (DR, 251). As Ideas are sub-representative, this points beyond the world of 
representation, beyond the determining judgments of the quotidian161. 
Deleuze’s learning is something more precise than what we in the everyday take it to be. He 
writes that “‘learning’ always passes through the subconscious, it always passes in the 
subconsciousness (DR, 214) 162.” The learner goes through something without being conscious of 
it—thus we cannot attain the exact moment of learning in empirical thinking. Indeed, when we 
add Deleuze’s characterisation of learning as “involuntary” and his association of a violence to it, 
suffered by the learner (DR 214–5), we are further drawn away from our usual conception of 
 
158  “Apprendre n’est que l’intermédiaire entre non-savoir et savoir, le passage vivant de l’un à l’autre” (DR, 215). 
159 My own example of learning to play an instrument, and Deleuze’s example of learning to swim, are both 
examples of learning a skill. Deleuze does not distinguish between learning a skill and learning something that can be 
expressed as a proposition. Indeed, he only utilizes the French ‘savoir’ (‘knowledge’), without distinguishing it from, 
for instance, ‘savoir-faire’ (‘know-how’). However, the cited passage about the act of learning between ‘savoir’ and 
‘non-savoir’ could be read as referring to either kind of learning. I will offer my resolution of this issue in 5.1. 
160 “Apprendre à nager, […] signifie composer les points singuliers de son propre corps […] avec ceux d’une autre 
figure, d’un autre élément qui nous démembre, mais nous fait pénétrer dans un monde de problèmes jusqu’alors 
inconnus, inouïs” (DR, 248). 
161 Levi Bryant does not distinguish between empirical thinking and transcendent thinking. However, he suggests 
that empirical thinking, and knowledge, hold back learning: “[t]hought emerges from a lived encounter that disrupts 
habit and functions like a trauma or an amorous encounter that calls to be comprehended. Knowledge, by contrast, 
seeks recognition so that it might prevent such encounters and establish the smooth continuity of experience.” 
(Bryant 2008, 76.) 




learning. Therefore, it must be stressed that Deleuze’s conception of learning departs from a 
conscious experience, which would fall within the empirical thinking.  
For Deleuze, learning points towards a truly transcendental conception of thinking. Indeed, he 
writes that the “transcendental conditions of thinking must be deducted [prélevées]” “from 
learning, not from knowledge” (DR, 216). He also writes that “to learn, is to elevate a faculty to 
its disjoint transcendent exercise” (DR, 251, see Benoit 2018 146; Voss 2013, 63–4)163. Clearly, 
learning is an instance of transcendent thinking164, but we need to keep in mind Deleuze’s precise 
meaning of ‘learning’. Learning, as a transcendent exercise of thinking, is unconscious, lies 
beyond representation (even if it’s outcome can be represented), and happens between the initial 
stage of non-knowledge and knowledge. 
At this point we can contrast transcendent thinking, with empirical thinking, as was evidenced by 
the determining judgment in the preceding chapter. Determining judgment operates on the level 
of representations. As we saw in chapter 3, when a judgment about an object of experience is 
made, the perceptual excitations of the object of experience are first represented as an intuition, 
and then it is recognized as conforming to a pregiven concept. In this way, empirical thinking 
functions along the model of recognition. As the object can only be recognized, this means that 
the system is closed: there can be no new concepts, and the objects of experience must conform 
to something already known. Deleuze writes that “representation and knowledge model 
themselves entirely upon the propositions of the consciousness, which designate cases of a 
solution; but these propositions themselves give a wholly inexact idea [notion] of the instances 
they resolve” (DR, 248)165. Therefore, empirical thinking gives us an inexact understanding of 
what we meet. The difficulty of empirical thinking arises from the way they see the problematic 
instances, from where problematic Ideas arise—they fashion these instances on the familiar 
model of recognition. Transcendent thinking on the other hand is able to immerse into this 
 
163 “[…] apprendre, c’est élever une faculté à son exercice transcendant disjoint” (DR, 251). 
164 Tano S. Posteraro writes “that learning is to be conceived as the processual development and deployment of 
ability, that abilities are to be conceived virtually, and that knowledge is to be thought in terms of the successful 
performance of these abilities.” (Posteraro 2015, 470). My interpretation coincides with the characterisation of 
“processual development”, but I would not use ‘deployment’, since it has an active connotation—something 
Deleuze’s learning is not. I do not want to venture into abilities, but Deleuze contrasts explicitly knowledge with 
learning, and so this reconceptualization departs from Difference and Repetition. 
165 “[…] la représentation et le savoir se modèlent entièrement sur les propositions de la conscience qui désignent les 
cas de solution ; mais ces propositions par elles-mêmes donnent une notion tout à fait inexacte de l’instance qu’elles 




problematic field—it is able to engage in learning, and thus transform and enrich the system of 
representational thinking of a psychic system.  
However, one might object that the empirical exercise of the faculties does not constitute thinking 
at all for Deleuze—that only transcendent thinking constitutes genuine thinking for Deleuze. I 
point out that in several instances, Deleuze refers to transcendent thinking as being constituted 
inside of thinking: “[…] the genesis of act of thinking in thinking itself” (DR, 182) and “thinking 
engendered inside thought” (DR, 353) . Also, when describing thinking, which remains “stupid”, 
that is without using all of its powers it can only attain in transcendent thinking, Deleuze again 
refers to “thinking” [pensée]. For these reasons, I maintain that Deleuze would take what I call 
empirical thinking, thinking. However, these do constitute two different types of thinking—just 
as I have argued above. In the next chapter, we are going to go through how transcendent 
thinking is able to venture where empirical thinking cannot—creation of something new in 
thinking. 
5. Thinking the New: Conclusions and Discussion 
In this chapter, I begin with a summary of the main goal of my Master’s thesis: my reading of 
thinking in Difference and Repetition. I also highlight in what ways it ameliorates the 
understanding of this issue in the secondary literature. Second, I discuss the implications 
transcendent thinking has for our conception of creation. Third, I evaluate how Deleuze succeeds 
overcoming some of the problems he has raised in his critique of Kant (and other philosophers 
committed to the dogmatic image of thought which I introduced in 3.2). Does Deleuze overcome 
the distinction between intuition and concept, or that between thought and being? In what sense is 
Deleuze’s conception of thinking not traced from the empirical? I will finish with a sketch of 
some further lines of investigation, which my research has raised. 
Transcendent thinking means that the quotidian thinking is disrupted. The workings of the 
cognitive capacities, or the faculties, of the thinker are forced into a discordant relation by an 
encounter in sensibility. A chain of encounters beginning from sensibility comes together in 
transcendent thinking. An Idea traverses the faculties, elevating them to their transcendent 
exercise. The limit-object of each faculty is something which only the faculty in question can 




imagination. The limit-object reveals the faculty’s internal difference. As the limit-objects of the 
faculties cannot be comprehended by other faculties, they cannot converge upon an identical 
object, nor collaborate harmoniously. In transcendent thinking, the faculties work according to a 
para-sense, opposed to the common sense of their empirical use which is part of the dogmatic 
image of thought Deleuze wants to escape. The resulting transcendent thinking is involuntary, 
sub-representational and unconscious (because conscious exercise is empirical and 
representational), escaping the yoke of representation Deleuze criticizes.  
My interpretation ameliorates our vision of thinking in Difference and Repetition. First, by 
reading Deleuze’s transcendent thinking in contrast to Kant’s determining judgment, I was able 
to frame this difficult concept with accuracy, making it possible to understand its implications 
fully. In the same way that the determining judgment is constituted by operations of imagination 
and the understanding, transcendent thinking is a result of the transcendent exercise of the 
faculties. This explains why Deleuze discusses so briefly the intermediate exercises of 
imagination and memory—they do not correspond to an experience, conscious or unconscious, 
and as such, are only understood as intermediate steps in the series coming together in 
transcendent thinking. This step was also crucial, because it uncovers the relation between 
empirical and transcendent thinking, as transcendent thinking is a disruption of the former.  
Second, my interpretation situates transcendent thinking into Deleuze’s overall ontology. John 
Roffe has distinguished objectal thinking (process of differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation) and subjectal thinking 
(what I have referred to as empirical thinking) in Difference and Repetition (see 4.3.). I add that 
transcendent thinking is a special case of differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation, something no interpreter has stressed 
(to my knowledge) before, as such, it is a special case of objectal thinking that runs through the 
actualized faculties of a psychic system.  
Third, my interpretation renders clear the relationship between learning and thinking: 
transcendent thinking is the more profound notion, whereas learning is an example (granted, a 
privileged one for Deleuze) of it. For instance, the otherwise incisive reading of Tano Posteraro 
(2015) fails to differentiate between thinking and learning (Posteraro 2015, 467), as does Daniela 
Voss’s otherwise excellent reading (Voss 2013, 61). My interpretation will lead to some 




5.1. Creation and Transcendent Thinking 
Deleuze identified himself as an empiricist in Whitehead’s sense. For him it meanS that his goal 
was to “find the conditions under which something new is produced.166” First, I will discuss what 
transcendent thinking tells us about creating something new in thinking. I then discuss, in a very 
preliminary manner, some lines of further investigation concerning transcendent thinking and 
creation in philosophy and the relation between transcendent thinking and Deleuze’s 
transcendental empiricism and his later philosophy.  
For Deleuze, “[…] thinking is not innate, but needs to be engendered in thinking.” (DR, 192; see 
Benit 2018, 26)167. Elsewhere, he states clearly that this means transcendent thinking: “Thinking 
is at the extreme order of a chain in which every faculty communicates the violence to another.” 
(DR, 251)168. So, in this sense, transcendent thinking revealed by Deleuze’s conception is what 
really ought to be taken for thinking. Empirical thinking is thinking which does not utilize its 
powers fully.  
To start transcendent thinking, we need an encounter: “[…] thinking does not think unless it is 
obliged [contrainte] and forced in the presence of that which ‘gives something to think’ about that 
which is to be thought about—and that which is thought about, it’s  the unthinkable or the non-
thought, that is the perpetual fact that “we are not thinking yet” (DR, 188)169. The unthinkable 
here refers to what is unthinkable from the point of view of empirical thinking. For Deleuze, this 
is the fact that empirical thinking sees itself as an exhaustive conception of thinking, as the 
perfect embodiment of thinking according to the image of thought (see 3.2). In other words, 
empirical thinking does not see the possibility of transcendent thinking. 
To think something new, to create an act of transcendent thinking, we need to disrupt empirical 
thinking. In empirical thinking, the faculties orient themselves into their habitual paths and 
processes. They function according to a pre-conceived common sense—presupposing what they 
 
166 “[…] trouver les conditions sous lesquelles se produit quelque chose de nouveau” (Deleuze 2003 (or. 1987), 284).  
167 “Il sait que penser n’est pas inné, mais doit être engendré dans la pensée” (DR, 192). 
168 “Pensée est à l’extrémité d’un ordre d’une chaîne dans laquelle chaque facultés communique la violence à l’autre” 
(DR, 251). 
169 “[...] la pensée ne pense que contrainte et forcée, en présence de ce qui “donne à penser”, de ce qui est à penser – 
et ce qui est à penser, c’est aussi bien l’impensable ou la non-pensée, c’est-à-dire le fait perpétuel que “nous ne 




meet is an identical unified object. In contrast, in their transcendent exercise, the faculties meet 
what is only proper to them, not something assumed to be unified. As highlighted by determining 
judgment, empirical thinking can only recognize objects it has already met, and as such, it is 
incapable of change (see Benit 2018, 24; Posteraro 2015, 456). In transcendent thinking, it 
ascends to “a terra incognita never recognized or recognizable.” (DR, 177)170, that is, to 
something new in thinking. 
In the psychic system, empirical thinking means that the system operates on its given constitution 
and the identity of the thinker remains the same throughout the act of thought. In the case of 
learning, we saw that this means a shift in the constitution of the thinker—in order to really learn 
something, the psychic system needs to reorient itself and change itself. Transcendent thinking 
disrupts empirical thinking and, indeed, changes it. After learning something new, the thinker has 
changed171.  
In the beginning of chapter 4, I noted in a footnote that Deleuze does not distinguish between 
learning a skill and learning something propositional. I believe that at this point we can clarify 
how these fit into Deleuze’s conception of learning. First, when we learn something 
propositional, the proposition is the result of the process of differenciation—it is the product of 
differenciation running through the faculties. This means that the psychic system’s possible states 
have shifted, as a new piece of representations is introduced into its circuit. Second, with learning 
a skill, the capacities of the thinker have been modified. As it is in most cases, this results in new 
capacities of the body of the thinker. For instance, the swimmer has learned to align his body and 
to paddle their limbs in a rhythm in a manner that they do not sink and actually move along the 
surface of the body of the water. In all kinds of learning, the actualization of the thinker (on the 
level of actual being) is shifted and this results in modifications on different levels. In the case of 
 
170 “[…] une terra incognita jamais reconnue ni reconnaissable” (DR, 177). 
171 Daniela Voss writes that the “‘exteriority of thought’ is distinguished from the form of interiority of thought, 
[page break] which closes thought upon itself. Deleuze aims to substitute for the Kantian transcendental conditions 
of knowledge qua representation transcendental, genetic conditions of the emergence of thought and the production 
of the real.” (Voss 2013, 25–26.) I agree with the latter sentence. However, whereas Voss conceptualizes the 
difference between empirical and transcendent thinking as a difference of interiority and exteriority, my 
interpretation emphasises that empirical thinking both kinds of thinking originate in the psychic system. However, 




a skill, the capacities of the body are extended or modified, whereas in the case of propositional 
learning, the variations and combinations the psychic system can undergo are extended. 
Indeed, Deleuze writes that “[t]he subject of cartesian cogito does not think, it only has the 
possibility of thinking, et keeps itself stupid within this possibility.” (DR 353–4.)172 This means 
that the thinker is retained within empirical thinking, unable to really produce anything new, only 
abstract iterations of what is already known. The thinker needs to open up to its internal 
difference to receive “the Difference in thinking, from which it can think” (DR 354).173 In 
transcendent thinking, the thinker opens up to its internal difference. The thinker of transcendent 
thinking is the fractured I, the “passive self originating from a non-foundation [d’un sans fond] 
which it contemplates” (DR, 354)174 that is, the passive self made up of contraction-
contemplation (see 1.3.), and arising from the internal difference. This self arises through the 
process of differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation. For Deleuze, “[…] thinking does not think but with difference, around 
this point of collapsing” (DR 354).175 To truly think, is to fall apart, and arise as something which 
has gone through a change. 
The bedrock for the emergence of something new is established in Deleuze’s new philosophy of 
difference. As the internal difference unravels, something new emerges, something which is not 
identical to what was before, but which is different to it. This is the ontological level of Deleuze’s 
project. “Actualisation, differenciation, in this sense, is a veritable creation” (DR, 273)176. Bryant 
reiterates well Deleuze’s claim: “Being creates, we are part of that creation. Being is not, for 




iation, it constitutes a transformation of the psychic system, which leads to a change in 
thinking: something new is thought177. Transcendent thinking constitutes the possibility of 
creation and creativity in subjective thought, in the thinking psychic systems undergo. 
 
172 “Le sujet du cogito cartésien ne pense pas, il a seulement la possibilité de penser, et se tient stupide au sein de 
cette possibilité” (DR, 353–4). 
173 “[…] la Différence dans la pensée, à partir de laquelle elle pense” (DR, 354). 
174 “[…] un moi passif issu d’un sans fond qu’il contemple” (DR, 354). 
175 “[…] la pensée ne pense qu’avec la différence, autour de ce point d’effondement” (DR, 354). 
176  “L’actualisation, la différenciation, en ce sens, est toujours une véritable creation” (DR, 273). 
177 Bryant is clearly mistaken in his interpretation of Deleuze’s thinking. Bryant seems to fall into a solipsism: 
“thought is no longer conceived of as a representation of being but is instead productive of being itself. For Deleuze, 




Indeed, transcendent thinking goes beyond the dogmatic image of thought. Deleuze writes that 
“[t]he condition of a real critique and real creation are the same: destruction of the image of 
thought which presupposes itself, genesis of the act of thinking in thinking itself” (DR, 182)178. In 
this passage, the condition of critique and creation is clearly transcendent thinking (“act of 
thinking in thinking itself”). What’s more, transcendent thinking is tantamount to destroying the 
dogmatic image of thought.  
At the end of the third chapter of Difference and Repetition, where Deleuze laid out his criticism 
against precedent thinkers for their reliance on the image of thought, he writes about the 
possibility of “thinking without image” (DR, 217).  This is thinking which “is born inside 
thinking, act of thinking engendered in its genitality, not given in innateness nor supposed in 
reminiscence” (DR, 217)179. Here, Deleuze clearly links transcendent thinking with the image of 
thought without image—a chance for philosophy to free itself from the yoke of the dogmatic 
image of thought and create something new. Additionally, in this way, our understanding of 
thinking can treat change, which is left out from the static dogmatic image of thought (DR, 286). 
However, this leads to the question of does transcendent thinking reveal the conditions of, or 
maybe even constitute a case of, creation in philosophy? Due to the scope of this Master’s thesis, 
I can only sketch out three (potentially irreconcilable) lines of interpretation, which would require 
more research to determine whether they would be backed by Deleuze’s texts. 
First, Deleuze calls his project in Difference and Repetition “transcendental empiricism” or a 
“superior empiricism” (DR, 80)180 and transcendent thinking must be connected to it181. Deleuze 
 
hold that all intuition is of this nature, though admittedly only a very limited zone of thought consciously takes this 
form.” (Bryant 2008, 12.) In this thesis, my interpretation relies on a correct situation of Deleuze’s thinking in his 
ontology. In this way, we can escape solipsistic misunderstandings. 
178 “Les conditions d’une véritable critique et d’une véritable création sont les mêmes : destruction de l’image d’une 
pensée qui se présuppose elle-même, genèse de l’acte de penser dans la pensée même” (DR, 182). 
179 “La pensée qui naît dans la pensée, l’acte de penser engendré dans sa génitalité, ni donné dans l’innéité ni supposé 
dans la réminiscence, est la pensée sans image” (DR, 217). 
180 Even later, Deleuze subscribed to the label of empiricism, which starts from the concrete: “to analyse the state of 
things, in the way we can draw from them non-pre-existing concepts. And the states of things are not unities, nor 
totalities, but multiplicities.” (Deleuze 2003b (or. 1987), 284)180.  
181 Transcendental empiricism does not only consist of subscribing to the ontology of Difference and Repetition and 
its extensive interpretation falls outside of my Master’s thesis. Daniela Voss describes it as follows: “If Deleuze calls 
his philosophy ‘transcendental empiricism', then he uses the term transcendental in an entirely modified meaning. 
The necessity of thought cannot be encountered by closing thought upon itself. Rather, thought must be opened up to 
the outside world that has to be conceived as a true exterior. The term ‘empiricism’ in Deleuze’s ‘transcendental 




writes that transcendental empiricism investigates the “intensive world of differences, where 
qualities discover their reason and the sensible its being” (DR, 80)182. Since we cannot directly 
investigate intensity, we can presume that transcendental empiricism needs to proceed through 
interpreting its signs in an analogous fashion to how sensibility meets intensity via the sign of 
sensible intensity (see 4.1.)183. How this happens exactly would need further research, but 
Francois Zourabichvili (2003) suggests that expositions of rare experiences from literature and 
clinical material could be utilized (pp. 35–6). Literal fantasies and descriptions of unconscious 
experiences (e.g. through case reports of schizophrenics) would include sign of intensity to be 
investigated. This line of interpretation preliminarily suggests that creation in philosophy, 
developing a conception of thinking beyond the dogmatic image of thought, would rely on 
interpretation of the signs of intensity from material describing cases of transcendent thinking184.  
Second line of interpreting the conditions of creation in philosophy, is to see philosophy as a 
system185, which needs to expose itself to encounters with non-philosophy. This presumes that 
transcendent thinking outlines the conditions of creation in general. A system must confront its 
internal difference, in order to change, and this happens through an encounter with its limit-
object. Philosophy’s encounter would then, preliminarily, consist of confronting non-philosophy 
like an empirical science or an art form, which pushes it to its limits (by posing a new 
philosophical problem, for instance). As a result, something new would emerge inside the system 
of philosophy as a result186.  
A third option would be to see that creation in philosophy would originate from philosophers, and 
transcendent thinking (learning) would be a description of it. However, this might not be 
 
Whatever forces us to think comes from this outside. It imposes itself upon us and intrudes as involuntary thought.” 
(Voss 2013, 25 ; see also Sauvagnargues 2010)” 
182 “Le monde intense des différences, où les qualités trouvent leur raison et le sensible, son être” (DR, 80). 
183 However, transcendental empiricism does not present itself as a universal method. Ideas always arise from 
problematic fields, so we need a new kind of approach for each domain, for each Idea (DR, 235). This highlights the 
way Difference and Repetition, marks out Deleuze as a post-structuralist. Even though he seems to outline a sort of 
structuralist metaphysics, claiming even that virtual “Idea defines itself as a structure,” (DR, 237), he opposes 
developing a universal method. 
184 Levi Bryant interprets transcendental empiricism as relying on an anti-methodology, made up of the phases of 
transcendent thinking (Bryant 2008, 18). My reading of transcendent thinking interprets it as subjective thinking, 
which philosophy as such can hardly undergo. 
185 Or alternatively, seeing as a system each philosophical theory, the work of a particular philosopher, or a tradition. 
186 Daniela Voss has noted that Deleuze’s reading of differential calculus should be seen itself as a productive 





compatible with seeing philosophy, or individual philosophical theories, as systems in the sense 
of Difference and Repetition. However, Deleuze writes that “the being of the sensible is revealed 
in works of art, at the same time that works of art appear as experimentations” (DR, 94). This 
would suggest the possibility of a philosopher encountering non-philosophy (art work), and 
transcendent thinking unravelling from this encounter. However, further research would be 
necessary to evaluate my preliminary doubt about this line of interpretation.  
These further lines of research could also investigate the possible connections and discontinuities 
of Difference and Repetition and later works. In the Letter-Preface to Jean-Clet Martin (2003c, 
original 1990), Deleuze reveals that the image of thought was still in 1990 the most important 
concept in Difference and Repetition for him.  He also connects an “exercice of thought” to the 
possibility of creative philosophy (p. 339, see Voss 2013, 30). If this exercise of thought was 
transcendent thinking, the connections between later works might prove fruitful. In What is 
Philosophy (1991), the last collaborative work between Deleuze and Guattari, they return to the 
concept of image of thought (e.g. Deleuze and Guattari 2005 (or. 1991), 41) and define 
philosophy’s task as that of creating concepts (ibid, 8). Maybe there too, transcendent thinking is 
somehow connected to creation in philosophy. 
However, to go back to the conception of transcendent thinking in Difference and Repetition, it 
seems to imply that creation involves less agency than we usually take it to. The notion of 
creation usually is associated with an idea of authorship and originality. A poet chooses what 
they want to write and a mathematician which equation to solve. However, does Deleuze’s 
conception of creation allow this? Empirical thinking is active but incapable of creation—it is 
forever doomed to repeat what has already been thought, as Deleuze outlines when he ascribes 
the model of recognition to it. However, transcendent thinking can create, but it is a forced act 
and lies in the subconsciousness of the thinker. Is there any room for agency here? Deleuze writes 
that “[t]he speech and actions of men engender material and nude repetitions, but as the effects of 
more profound repetitions of another kind” (DR, 371)187. This passage would suggest that human 
subjects would have fairly restrained agency, being doomed to reiterate already given paths and 
being incapable of genuine choices. Even though this suggestion would need further 
 
187 “Les paroles et les actions des hommes engendrent des répétitions matérielles ou nues, mais comme l’effet de 




investigation, we can conclude that creation in thinking, and elsewhere, is modelled along 
transcendent thinking and as such, does not allow for creative agency. Creation originates from 
being and cannot be but suffered by the psychic system for something truly new to emerge188. 
5.2. Beyond Kant 
Evidently, Kant’s influence for Deleuze’s conception of thinking has been enormous (see 
chapters 3 and 4). Additionally, Deleuze locates the discovery of internal difference in Kant’s 
critique of Descartes (see 1.1.) and he even sees Kant’s third Critique as opening up the way for 
transcendent thinking (see 3.3.). However, in an interview, Deleuze classified Kant as an 
“enemy” (Deleuze 1990, 15). Indeed, Deleuze criticises Kant relentlessly, and in this subchapter, 
I discuss whether Deleuze succeeds in overcoming two objections he has posed to Kant. First, 
does Deleuze fare better in providing a transcendental conception of subjectivity than Kant, 
whom he criticizes for tracing the transcendental from the empirical? Second, Deleuze does not 
accept Kant’s duality between intuition and concept—does Deleuze’s own description of thinking 
overcome this duality? 
Deleuze criticizes Kant for tracing the transcendental from the empirical: “contrary to what Kant 
believes, it [i.e. the transcendental] cannot be deduced from ordinary empirical forms as they 
appear under the determination of a sensus communis189” (DR, 186; see Deleuze 2003c (or. 
1990), 339; see Voss 2013, 24)190. In 3.1., we saw that the empirical, psychological description, 
of thinking rests upon the common sense of the faculties. Deleuze does not dispose with the 
faculties altogether as he holds a theory of the faculties as necessary for philosophy (DR, 186). If 
we take Kant’s route, according to Deleuze, we anchor our conception of the transcendental 
conditions of experience unto empirical human psychology. Deleuze wants to avoid this, and 
 
188 The prevalent view among French thinkers of the time seems to have been to question authorship and free agency. 
For instance, in Michel Foucault’s (1926–1984) What is an Author? (Foucault 2004 or. 1969, pp. 290–318), Foucault 
questions our assumptions about a literal works author’s role and significance. However, Deleuze’s view on 
restricted agency finds its justification in the ontological scheme of Difference and Repetition. 
189 The allegation of tracing the transcendental condition of experience from empirical psychology might seem 
perplexing to many readers of Kant. However, as we saw in 3.1., Deleuze is basing his claim on a reading of Kant’s 
A-deduction with its synthesis of the faculties making up the determining judgment, or the judgment of experience. 
Maybe Deleuze is uncovering the reason why Kant made the changes to the later B-edition of the deduction. 
190 “[…] contrairement à ce que croyait Kant, il ne peut pas être induit des formes empiriques ordinaires telles 




therefore, the transcendental has to be discovered in another kind of thinking, namely 
transcendent thinking, where the faculties do not converge under common sense (DR, 186).  
This leads Deleuze to leave his conception of faculties open-ended191: he states that we might 
discover new faculties and talks about non-conventional faculties, such as the faculties of 
language and sociability192. (DR, 186–7, 330–1, see also Voss 2013, 142.) This is a clear 
departure from Kant, for whom the faculties are stable, and his picture of them intended to be 
definitive.  
For Deleuze, the faculties are not the faculties of a transcendental subject, nor those of a 
particular empirical psychic system. A conception of faculties must be situated into his overall 
ontology. Levi Bryant is right in taking faculties to be “tendencies characterizing being” (Bryant 
2008, 97–8). For Deleuze, faculties must arise from being, and they cannot be those of a 
particular empirical subject (see Voss 2013, 142)—they must explain the constitution of 
subjectivity in all of its possible manifestations193.  
However, Deleuze does not provide an explicit description of how to situate the faculties to the 
process of differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation. I take it that, as any object, the faculty too has a virtual side, and an 
actual side (see chapter 2). For instance, the virtual Idea of memory must have arisen from a 
certain problematic field. For example, animals have developed different kinds of capacities of 
recollection in interaction with their environment. In order to survive, recollection of, for instance 
the location of past food sources, has been necessary. However, the food sources of different 
species require different kinds of capabilities (for instance, migratory birds have exceptional 
 
191 I take the open-ended nature of Deleuze’s faculties leads him to refrain from enumerating or outlining different 
types of acts of cognition. If there can be unheard of faculties, what would be the point of giving an exhaustive list of 
different types of mental acts? However, Deleuze takes Kant as providing a conception of the empirical exercise of 
the faculties, and of empirical thinking (DR 186).  
192 Deleuze is quick to add that he is not striving for “the establishment of such a doctrine of the faculties”, instead, 
pursuing only to seek our the “nature of its requirements [exigences]” (DR, 187). With seems in line with my idea 
that the account of the faculties should be left open-ended—something a full doctrine would strive to close 
definitively. However, a further line of research would be open to verify whether Deleuze develops further his 
account of different faculties in his oeuvre.  
193 The reader is reminded of the three syntheses of time I introduced in the first chapter. I take it that there Deleuze 
is explaining the emergence of passive subjectivity from the point of view of the concepts difference and repetition, 
with time as the form of change being an important aspect as well. Here, I am turning toward the emergence of 








navigational capacities, which for Deleuze, would be related to the faculty of memory). On the 
one hand, the virtual Idea of memory has been differentiated from a problematic field constituted 
by these kinds of problems. On the other hand, the Idea of a faculty is actualised in different ways 
in different psychic systems. This means that the Idea of a faculty finds many kinds of actual 
manifestations. 
Second, who or what is Deleuze’s thinker here? The faculties arise from being, but they situate 
themselves within a psychic system. To be precise, Deleuze talks about the psychic system of the 
“Self-I”, instead of the term subject. The “Self” is the content of the system, the different 
faculties or capabilities of thinking. The “I” refers to the psychic organization of the psychic 
system, or how the different capabilities relate to one another and how they interact. (DR, 330–
1.)194 The actualization of a psychic system must progress in the familiar manner of 
differenciation. The actualised faculties correspond to the differential relations of the Idea, 
whereas their organization to the singular points of the Idea195. As the virtual Idea of the psychic 
system is actualised, these aspects of the virtual Idea get their actual manifestation.  




produces the faculties and how they operate, subjectivity is no longer modeled on the empirical 
manifestation of a human subjectivity. This leads to the consequence that subjectivity is 
manifested through different animated beings in diverse ways: different constellations of 
cognitive capacities are formed, and in each case, the actualized faculty aligns itself unto a 
continuum with other incarnations of the faculty. Thus, psychic systems cannot any more be 
analysed along clear-cut categorizations—it would be more appropriate, for instance to speak 
about variation of rationality in animals, than of the human animal being separated from the other 
 
194 I am leaving out the possibility of a single faculty arising. In that case, it would not have a relation to any other 
faculties and would thus only satisfy the content characteristic of a psychic system. However, it might be envisaged 
that singular faculties might themselves be taken to be psychic systems. This might mean that the Idea of a faculty 
would become too large: would a piece of paper, or any surface which can be used for mark-making, count as an 
actualization of memory? This line of interpretation would lead to a pan-psychism Deleuze did not seem to uphold. 
195 Where Levi Bryant writes that the faculties “are the differentials or joints of being itself, and not faculties of a 




be precise, a faculty does find an actual expression in an actual psychic system, in “a subject’s mind”. However, he is 
right in emphasising the difference between Deleuze’s conception of faculty from, for instance, the Kantian 




by its rationality (given that not all psychic systems exemplify all particular capabilities 
associated with being rational).  
Second objection Deleuze has posed to Kant is the denial of the separation between concept and 
intuition (DR 79–80; see Bryant 2008, 8–9). In 3.1., we saw how Deleuze’s reading of Kant’s 
determining judgment places importance on the notion of schematisation. This step in the 
syntheses adapts intuitions for the application of understanding’s concepts and, in fact, it covers 
over the gap between intuition and concept. For Kant, the two are separated: they differ in kind, 
which raises the question of how they can in principle come to interact (see Watkins 2017). Thus, 
schematisation functions for Kant as the bridge between these two kinds of things. However, 
Kant does not provide details on how this happens, as he writes that “schematism of our 
understanding is a hidden art [Kunst] in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we 
can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty” (CPR, A141/B180–
1).  
For Deleuze, there is no such separation between intuition and concept. The virtual multiplicities, 
Ideas, arise from being in the process of differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation. As we saw in 2.3., virtual Ideas and 
actual being progress in differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation. There is no strict separation between concept and 
intuition, nor between being and thought in Deleuze. The virtual is an ontological order, not 
something absolutely separated from being. And as Ideas are the differentials of thinking, as in 
4.2., there is no separation akin to that of intuition and concept. Experience is synthesised in the 
unravelling of this process in being196. This means that Deleuze’s ontology avoids the pitfalls he 
attributes to philosophies which rely on a separation of thought and being (such as Platonic ideas 
removed from the ephemeral reality of experience) or intuition and thought (such as Kant).  
5.3. Further Questions for Investigation 
So far, we have encountered several further lines of investigation raised by my Master’s thesis. 
First, offering a consistent reading of the ontological order of intensity. Second, interpreting the 
 
196 Levi Bryant writes in a similar vein: “[t]he Ideas uncovered in the encounter are real, independent of subjectivity, 
and their intelligibility has a universality proper to it that is every bit as binding as that found in Platonic forms. Here 
the essences discovered through the encounter are not beings of a subject's thought, but belong to being itself in such 




expressive relation between intensity and virtual Ideas (something which concerns especially how 
objectal thinking, and following my reading, also transcendent thinking, are expressions of a 
virtual Idea, see 2.3. and chapter 4). Third, situating transcendent thinking in relation to 
transcendental empiricism (something I was able to only discuss only preliminarily in 5.1.). 
Fourth, investigating the importance of transcendent thinking and image of thought without an 
image for Deleuze’s later thinking and collaborations with Guattari would constitute another 
interesting research opportunity. Fifth, even though Deleuze outlines the conditions of creation, 
this doesn’t seem to leave any room for freedom, or unrestricted agency. Looking whether there 
is a resolution somewhere in Deleuze’s work for this would constitute a new subject of research. 
Below, I am going to outline further lines of research which arise from my interpretation of 
transcendent thinking.  
First, even though I read Kant’s determining judgment as an example of empirical thinking, 
further research is required to understand more clearly how Deleuze sees this phenomenon. In 
this Master’s thesis, empirical thinking was treated mainly as providing a necessary backdrop for 
interpreting transcendent thinking. On the one hand, is empirical thinking based on, or does it 
arise from objectal thinking? In 1.3., I discussed how identities are produced by difference and 
repetition. In the preceding subchapter, I argued that the constitution of the psychic system is 
engendered by differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation: the faculties are an actualization of a virtual Idea, and they make 
up the psychic system. However, is empirical thinking, representational thinking, in its entire 
spectre produced as an effect of differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation the psychic system undergoes in the same way, 
e.g., identities are produced? 
On the other hand, the status of logic and mathematical laws is itself a question worthy of further 
investigation in Deleuze’s oeuvre—and it also concerns empirical thinking. In the overall scheme 
we have unraveled here, mathematical entities and structures, maybe even logic, might be located 
on the level of representation. However, further research would be needed to determine what the 
status of these entities and laws is. Are they also a product of differen 
𝑡
𝑐
iation197, or would they be 
 
197 In some instances, it seems Deleuze alludes to a similar relation of process and product, as we saw in the case of 
the differenciation of actual objects as the conditions of representation of objects. Take for instance this sentence: 




more precisely tendencies of being? Further investigation to these topics would probably have to 
look beyond Difference and Repetition (1968) to complement its picture with The Logic of Sense 
(1969) and later works. 
The preceding line of investigation leads to the next one: the question of Deleuze’s relation to 
phenomenology. First, contrasting, e.g., Edmund Husserl’s early phenomenology on the status of 
mathematical and logical truths might prove fruitful for the previous line of enquiry. Husserl 
criticized psychologism, i.e. the view that logical and mathematical truths fall within empirical 
psychology (Zahavi 2003,8). Due to Deleuze’s insistence on avoiding empirical psychology as 
the basis of a transcendental conception of thinking (see 5.2), a psychologistic account of logical 
laws and mathematics does seem out of question for Deleuze198. For Husserl, psychologistic 
account does not do justice to the difference of kind between logical truths (being necessary) and 
the act which utilize them (acts which are contingent). In order to account for these, Husserl 
established phenomenology to study the objects of knowledge and the a priori features of the 
conscious acts which deal with them. (Zahavi 2003, 11.) From there, Husserl envisioned we 
could proceed to the foundation of a priori laws of logic and mathematics (ibid, 8). Even though 
Deleuze does not seem to have any similar founding motivation, and he might even disagree with 
Husserl on the difference of kind between mathematical objects and the intentional acts treating 
them, Deleuze’s views about empirical thinking might be illuminated in contrast with early 
Husserl. 
However, more interesting questions arise concerning Deleuze’s relation and probable 
opposition, to phenomenological method199. Some key concepts of phenomenology, such as 
consciousness and intentionality seem to be missing almost completely from Difference and 
Repetition. Transcendent thought is vital for Deleuze’s project of transcendental empiricism. As 
transcendental thought is unconscious and nonvoluntary, it resists first-person exploration 
phenomenology utilizes to attain necessary structures of thought (see Zourabicvili 2003, 45–6). 
 
dynamisms” (Deleuze 2002b, 134–5). However, Deleuze might be just suggesting that a logical division presupposes 
a division arising from his procedural ontological level.  
198 In 2.2., I explored Deleuze’s interpretation of the differential calculus. However, Deleuze does not take the 
differential calculus to answer questions about logic and mathematics in general, and I used the interpretation for 
expository purposes to highlight Deleuze’s conception of virtual Ideas. (see 2.2. above). 
199 Alain Beaulieu has stated that phenomenology has been a constant preoccupation of Deleuze throughout his 




Investigating exactly why Deleuze departs from phenomenology would be an illuminating 
subject in itself and also work as a good challenge to Deleuze. 
A further difference arises, when we focus on the role of the ego, the thinking self. In Deleuze’s 
transcendental thinking, the thinker’s identity is disrupted (see 4.2.). Contrary to many 
phenomenologists200, Deleuze aims to divert from the first-person investigation. Indeed, 
transcendent thinking relies on the fractured I, whose internal difference has been exposed, and in 
a sense, opened to its changing outside. However, Deleuze must have been familiar201 with non-
egological account of phenomenology in Sartre’s Transcendence of the Ego (1936)202 and it 
would be interesting to explore further what similarities persist between these two—this would 
clarify the methodological aspect of transcendental empiricism. 
All in all, Deleuze’s conception of thinking in Difference and Repetition is highly complex but 
extremely versatile. It situates all kinds of entities, from virtual Ideas to emerging psychic 
systems, in the same ontological scheme. Conceptual structures do not float to a Platonic heaven, 
nor is thinking reduced to the material functioning of the brain. Thinking, in both its empirical 
and transcendent exercise, is explained as a process embedded into being. As I have shown, this 
also reveals the conditions of change and creation, albeit with the implication that creation is not 
chosen or performed, but instead undergone or suffered through. To engender something new in 
thought, thinking needs to open up to its constituting internal difference, and unconsciously attain 
something novel, changing the thinker in the process. All in all, Deleuze’s conception of thinking 
in Difference and Repetition points towards important implications and further elaborations, 
some of which this Master’s thesis has striven to outline.    
 
200 For instance, for Husserl in Ideas I, even after performing the phenomenological reduction, “the pure ego seems 
to be something intrinsically necessary and something absolutely identical in the course of every actual and possible 
change of experiences” (Husserl 2014, §57, 105). In this way, “the ego is inherent in every experience as it comes 
about and streams away” (ibid.). 
201 Sartre’s influence is hinted at, for instance, Deleuze cites Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (1943) in the early text 
from 1945, Description of the Woman (Deleuze 2015c, 253), but it is testified explicitly by “He was my master” 
(Deleuze 2002c, or. 1964). 
202 For a nonegoic interpretation of Sartre’s text, see Vincini and Gallagher (2016). Vincini and Gallagher also 
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